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SUMMARY
In maritime transportation, liner shipping accounts for over 60% of the value
of goods shipped. However, very limited literature is available on the study of various
problems in liner shipping. In this thesis we focus on problems related to this industry.
Given a set of cargo to be transported, a set of ports and a set of ships, a common
problem faced by carriers in liner shipping is the design of their service network. We
develop an integrated model to design service network for the ships and to route
the available cargo, simultaneously. The proposed model incorporates many relevant
constraints, such as the weekly frequency constraint on the operated routes, and
emerging trends, such as obtaining benefits from transshipping cargo on two or more
service routes, that appear in practice but have not been considered previously in
literature. Also, we design exact and heuristic algorithms to solve the integer program
efficiently. The proposed algorithms integrate the ship scheduling problem, a tactical
planning level decision, and the cargo routing problem, an operational planning level
decision, and provide good overall solution strategy. Computational experiments
indicate that larger problem instances, as compared to the literature, can be solved
using these algorithms in acceptable computational time.
Alliance formation is very common among global liner carriers however a quanti-
tative study of liner alliances is missing from literature. We provide a mathematical
framework for the quantitative study of these alliances. For the formation of a sustain-
able alliance, carriers need to agree on an overall service network and resolve issues
concerning distribution of benefits and costs among the members of the alliance. We
develop mechanisms to design a collaborative service network and to manage the
interaction among the carriers through the allocation of profits in a fair way. The
x
mechanism utilizes inverse optimization techniques to obtain resource exchange costs
in the network. These costs provide side payments to the members, on top of the
revenue generated by them in the collaborative solution, to motivate them to act in




Sea cargo is the freight carried by ships. It includes anything traveling by sea other
than mail, persons and personal baggage. Sea cargo transportation is a cheap, safe
and clean transportation mode, compared to other modes of transportation. Rates for
sea cargo transportation are approximately one-tenth of air freight rates. Increasing
globalization and inter-dependence of various world economies is leading to a tremen-
dous positive growth in the sea cargo industry. International and domestic trade of
many nations depends on this mode of transportation and it has helped many na-
tions such as Singapore to shape their export-dominated economy. According to [5],
in United States, which is the largest trading nation in the world for both imports
and exports - accounting for nearly 20% of world trade, sea cargo is responsible for
moving over 99% of the international cargo. U.S. ports and waterways handle more
than 2.5 billion tons of trade annually, and that volume is projected to double within
the next fifteen years.
As depicted in Figure 1, the increase in sea-borne trade worldwide has led to
similar trends in the growth of the world fleet. Although the fleet mix and size have
changed over time considerably, for example the recent use of bigger ships, the main
motive of the industry remains the same - efficient utilization of the ships. The
increasing sea-borne trade and the increasing size of the world fleet presents new
challenges for planners and demands attention from researchers to develop optimiza-
tion based decision support systems for efficient fleet management and routing of the
cargo.
Next, we discuss some of the emerging trends in this industry. Prior to that, a
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Figure 1: Growth of the world fleet and sea-borne trade. Source: Lloyd’s Register
of Shipping
couple of definitions are in place. A sea carrier is a person, business or organization
that offers transportation services via sea on a worldwide basis. A shipper is a person
or company who is either the supplier or the owner of the cargo that is to be shipped.
Today sea carriers offer a global transport solution to a global shipper with global
shipping needs.
1.1 Emerging Trends in Sea Cargo
The sea cargo industry is going through many changes that are reshaping the face of
this industry forever.
• One of the most prominent changes is the increasing use of containers. Con-
tainerized cargo is the cargo that have been physically and economically stowed
in a container. Containerization of cargo minimizes port labor, maximizes ship’s
capacity utilization and has revolutionized the sea cargo industry. The dimen-
sions of containers have been standardized and the term twenty foot equivalent
unit (TEU) is used to refer to one twenty foot long container. For example a
20 feet long container is expressed by 1 TEU and a 60 feet long container is
expressed by 3 TEUs. According to [24], at the start of 1980s only around 20%
2
Figure 2: Growth in container movements worldwide. Source: Drewry Container
Market Quarterly
of all general cargo shipments were carried in containers. In 2001 this figure in-
creased to 60%. An IBM white paper [45] shows that container shipping market
is still growing at 8-10% per year. This trend is also depicted by Figure 2.
A serious challenge associated with container shipping is the repositioning of
empty containers. Because of the huge imbalance in demand on some trade
routes, carriers need to reposition empty containers. For example, there is a high
demand of commodities in America from Asia but not vice versa thus, carriers
need to reposition empty containers from America to Asia. This process involves
huge costs. According to [51], a 10% reduction in equipment and repositioning
costs can potentially increase profitability by 30-50%.
• Sea cargo industry has seen a tremendous growth in number as well as in size
of transshipment ports. A transshipment port is a port where cargo is trans-
ferred from one ship to another which is bound for different local, regional or
global ports. Through a sequence of moves by cranes, cargo is transferred ei-
ther directly from a ship to another or temporarily stored at the port before
being loaded onto outbound ships for further transportation. Use of containers
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makes this transfer very convenient and cost effective. Transshipment services
provide carriers with additional routing options, reduced transit times and act
as facilitator of international trade. For example the Hutchinson terminal in
Freeport, Bahamas has become a major transshipment port between the East-
ern Gulf Coasts of the United States, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, South
America, and trade lanes to European, Mediterranean, far Eastern and Aus-
tralian destinations. Other major international transshipment ports include
Singapore, Port Klang in Malaysia and Hong Kong. In 2003, approximately
30% of worldwide container movements were transshipped and it is believed
that this number is rising. According to [65], 80% of all containers handled at
the port of Singapore, world’s second largest container port and world’s busiest
port in terms of shipping tonnage, are transshipments.
• Traditionally, companies have focused on their own resources and ability to per-
form effectively and efficiently. However recently the many and varied carriers in
the sea-cargo industry, who in the past worked independently of each other, are
working in close liaison. Shipping alliances allow carriers to realize economies
of scale, extend customer base and increase asset utilization while providing
customers with more frequent sailings. Since 1990, when Sea-Land and Maersk
introduced the alliance system and began sharing vessels in the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans, mergers have become increasingly common. Recently, smaller
alliances are collaborating to form even bigger alliances, for example The Grand
Alliance and The New World Alliance laid down foundations for cooperating in
2006.
1.2 Liner Shipping
Global shipping can be distinguished into three different modes of operation - indus-
trial, tramp and liner. In industrial shipping, the shipper owns the ships and aims to
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minimize the shipping cost. In tramp shipping, a carrier engages in contracts with
shippers to carry bulk cargo between specified ports within a specific time frame.
Additional cargo (if any available in the market) are picked depending on the fleet
capacity to maximize revenue. In liner shipping, a carrier decides on a set of voyages,
makes the schedule available to shippers and operates on it. Thus, one can identify
industrial shipping with “owning a car,” tramp shipping with “a taxi service” and
liner shipping with “a bus service” with definite schedules and a published itinerary.
As the focus of this thesis is liner shipping, we now discuss it in detail. Liner
shipping mainly involves carrying containerized cargo on regularly scheduled service
routes. Liner services involve higher fixed costs and administrative overhead than
for example tramp shipping because tramps usually wait until they are full before
departing from a port whereas liner services promise to depart on predetermined
schedules regardless of whether the ship is full. The number of ships required for a
given liner service route is determined principally by the frequency required on the
service route, the distance travelled by a ship on the route and the speed of the ship.
For example, a weekly liner service between New York and Hamburg may require four
ships to maintain the necessary frequency.
As observed by [15], liner shipping is growing at a high pace with the increasing
global container traffic. In the United States, in 2003, liner shipping with its network
of ships, containers, port terminals and information systems, handled over 60% of
the total sea-borne trade. According to [8] between January 2000 and January 2006,
the TEU capacity deployed on global liner trades has risen from 5,150,000 TEUs to
9,135,000 TEUs, a 77.4% increase.
Liner shipping involves decision making at strategic, tactical and operational plan-
ning levels. Figure 3 outlines the key decisions that need to be made at different levels
of the planning horizon.





Strategic Planning (long term) 
Acquire resources, determine fleet size and mix  
General policies  
and guidelines 
Goals, rules  
and limits 




Tactical Planning (medium term) 
Design the service network (frequency of routes, port selection, 
port rotation), assign ships to routes 
Operational Planning (short term) 
Choose which cargo to accept/reject for routing, route the 
selected cargo 
Simultaneous ship scheduling and cargo routing problem 
Figure 3: Different planning levels for liner shipping
the fleet. Given that a ship involves huge capital investment (usually millions of
US dollars) and the cost of idling a 2,000TEU ship is $20,000-$25,000 per day, the
strategic problem is extremely important.
The tactical planning decision involves decisions regarding an optimal design of
service routes, i.e. the sequence of ports to be serviced by the given fleet and the
assignment of ships to these routes. Ships move in cycles from one port to another
following the same port rotation for the entire planning horizon. We refer to this
problem as the ship scheduling problem.
The operational planning problem involves decisions regarding which cargo to
accept or reject and which path(s) to use to ship the selected cargo. We refer to this
problem as the cargo routing problem. A carrier may select not to transport some
cargo, either because it is not profitable or because there is other cargo, perhaps at
other ports, that is relatively more profitable. A cargo starts its trip from an in-land
location and may or may not visit an intermediate port before arriving at its origin
port. This network which utilizes trucks or railroad to bring cargo from an inland
location to ports or ships to bring cargo from intermediate ports to origin ports is
known as the feeder network. Cargo then moves from its origin port to its destination
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port, possibly after visiting some intermediate ports. From there it is taken to its final
in-land destination using another feeder network. Some of the intermediate ports that
a cargo visits during its journey from the origin port to the destination port may act
as transshipment ports where transfer of cargo from one ship to another takes place.
The decisions made at one planning level affect decision making at other plan-
ning levels as well. The decisions at the strategic level set the general policies and
guidelines for the decision making at the tactical and operational levels. Similarly,
the decisions at the tactical level set the limitations and network structure for the
operational planning level. In the reverse direction, the information (for example
cost and revenue) provide the much needed feedback for decision making at a higher
level. Given a fleet size and mix, the service network laid at the tactical planning
level governs which routes can be formed at the operational planning level to route
cargo. The cargo picked at the operational planning level and the routes selected
determine the cost and revenue that can be generated and thus the profitability of
the given service network. These two problems are highly inter-dependent and thus
it is important that they be studied in an integrated framework.
Collaboration and alliance formation is a common phenomenon among liner ship-
ping operators. Carriers used conferences, as a means for curbing competition and
controlling tariff rates in the market, as early as 1875. More recently, carriers are
forming strategic alliances that allow them to realize economies of scale, extend their
customer base and increase asset utilization while providing customers with more
frequent sailings and faster transit times ([64]). Alliances account for more than half
of the liner services on major global routes. In the mid 1990s an estimated 60% of
the total global liner capacity was accounted by alliances. Typically members of an
alliance pool their ships on a particular trading route and allocate part of each ship’s
capacity to the alliance members. As a result of these alliances and agreements,
shipments arranged through one carrier may actually be moved by a ship operated
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by another and alliance members can offer higher sailing frequencies than would be
possible using only their own ships. Alliances are most common on deep sea routes
such as the Asia-North America route that require a bigger commitment in terms
of assets (ships) from carriers. Also, alliances are used to achieve cost efficiencies,
especially in terminal operations.
Alliances lead to many large scale problems at the tactical and the operational
planning level such as managing a large pool of ships, as contributed by the members
of the alliance, and designing a large scale network to satisfy multiple demands due
to various carriers. Members of an alliance together decide on a set of routes to
operate. Also they need to decide how to realize these routes i.e. how should the
different members of the alliance assign their ships to the selected routes. Further
they need to decide how to share the benefits of the alliance. Thus, successful alliance
formation requires allocation algorithms for distributing benefits, costs, and assets’
capacity among the members of the alliance in a fair way to motivate them to “play
along.”
1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
The contribution of this thesis is two fold. First, we present an integrated study of
the tactical and the operational planning level problems in liner shipping. As shown
in Figure 3 we refer to this problem as the simultaneous ship scheduling and the cargo
routing problem. Our goal is to account for the emerging trends in liner shipping
(containerization and transshipments) in our model and to solve the large scale opti-
mization problem efficiently. Second, a detailed study of the alliance formation among
liner carriers is performed.
In the first part of the thesis (Chapter 2) we present an integrated model, a mixed
integer linear program, to schedule ships in a given fleet and efficiently route the max-
imum possible cargo, simultaneously. Our model handles many relevant constraints
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and emerging trends that appear in practice but have not been considered previ-
ously. For instance, customers expect carriers to provide them a regular schedule by
maintaining at least weekly frequency on the routes they operate on. This constraint
however has not been considered in the literature. Use of containers to ship cargo
has revolutionized the international cargo shipping industry. However, huge imbal-
ance in demand in various world economies leads to the problem of empty container
repositioning. The proposed model ensures weekly frequency on the operated routes
and has the flexibility to incorporate empty container repositioning. Our model also
allows cargo routes to encompass a combination of service routes rather than a single
service route, thus providing carriers with increased routing opportunities. We are
not aware of any earlier results on transshipment of containers at an intermediate
port from one ship to another. We consider a heterogenous fleet with ships of differ-
ent sizes, cost structures and speeds. As is common in container shipping, we allow
multiple pickup and delivery on ships. These features allow the use of our model in
a wide variety of problem settings.
The proposed integer program is too large to be solved economically by general
mixed integer programming codes, thus we develop algorithms to solve it efficiently.
More specifically, a greedy heuristic, a column generation based algorithm and a two
phase Bender’s decomposition based algorithm is developed and their computational
efficiency in terms of the solution quality and the computational time taken is dis-
cussed. These algorithms exploit the separability of the problem and utilize the fact
that the ship scheduling problem can be reduced to a cycle generation problem and
the cargo routing problem can be reduced to a multicommodity flow problem. We
also propose an efficient iterative search algorithm to generate schedules for ships.
Computational experiments are performed on randomly generated instances simulat-
ing real life with up to 20 ports and 100 ships and the results are presented. Our
computational results are encouraging and establish that the algorithms developed
9
here can be used to solve larger instances, as compared to the literature.
The second part of the thesis concerns with the challenges offered by alliances.
As carriers form alliances by pooling their ships and integrating their networks, the
maximum overall revenue that an alliance can generate can be obtained by replacing
individual carriers with one large carrier, with a fleet equal to the combined fleet
of the individual carriers and a demand structure equal to the combined demand
of all carriers. We refer to this problem as the optimization problem for the grand
coalition and to its solution as the collaborative optimal solution. Though working in
collaboration, carriers cannot be assumed to follow the collaborative optimal solution
but their own self-interests. For example on collaborative routes the “resource,” e.g.
capacity on a ship, belongs to some carrier who does not allow other carriers to freely
obtain “benefits” from using it. Thus, for sustainable alliances, the task is not only
to solve large scale optimization problems but also to provide algorithms to share the
benefits of alliances in such a way that the best overall solution is obtained and all
carriers are motivated to collaborate. The split of income and costs is an intriguing
research topic and very little is available in literature on the systematic study of
alliances among sea carriers. We provide algorithms to guide the members of an
alliance in deciding which routes to operate, how to operate the chosen routes, how
to distribute the capacity on ships and how to share the benefits from the alliance.
Chapter 3 presents the motivation behind alliance formation among carriers in
liner shipping. We then study a special case of the problem and utilize the linear pro-
gramming machinery to allocate the overall benefit generated by the alliance among
its members in a “fair” way. The notion of “core,” which guarantees that the sum of
benefits allocated among the members is their maximum attainable benefit and no
subset of members can collude and obtain better benefits for its members, is utilized
to define fairness.
Study of collaboration among carriers in liner shipping led us to the study of a more
10
general multi-commodity flow game. In a maximum multi-commodity flow problem
given a set of demand to be satisfied and capacity on the edges of the network the
objective is to maximize the revenue generated by simultaneously satisfying different
demands in such a way that the total amount of flow through each edge is no more
than the edge’s capacity. In the multi-commodity flow game, demand in the network
and the capacity on the edges is owned by different members. The goal of each
member is to use the underlying capacity in the network to satisfy his own demand.
However, members often need to exchange capacity in the network to realize this
goal. This framework where a number of participants interact in a multi-commodity
flow setting occurs in many real life applications in transportation and logistics. In
Chapter 4, we present a mechanism that facilitates capacity exchange on the edges
of the network among the alliance members in a multi-commodity flow game setting.
Specifically, the mechanism provides capacity exchange costs on the edges of the
network to motivate a member who owns the capacity on an edge to sell it to another
member who can utilize that capacity to satisfy his own demand. In a special case,
when each of the network edges is owned by an unique member we show that the
allocation made by our mechanism provides an allocation in the core.
Finally, we present membership mechanisms that allocate resources and benefits
to carriers for forming sustainable alliances in liner shipping. In literature, although
some qualitative studies are available, a quantitative study of liner shipping alliances
is missing. In Chapter 5, we provide a mathematical framework to study alliance
formation among liner carriers. We compute an optimal collaborative solution for
the alliance by solving the network design problem for a large fictitious carrier with
demand and fleet equal to the sum of the demand and fleet of individual carriers.
However, individual carriers in the alliance cannot be assumed to accept the optimal
collaborative solution. More over, for an individual carrier, the revenue generated
by satisfying demand and the cost incurred on the collaborative routes is often not
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enough to motivate him to behave in the best interest of the alliance. We develop
algorithms that provide side payments to carriers so that the best overall revenue is
generated for the alliance. This is achieved by finding capacity exchange costs (as in
Chapter 4) so that a carrier who has unused space on his ships is motivated to sell it
to carrier who can use it to transport his cargo. Our computational results suggest
that the mechanism can be used to help carriers form sustainable alliances.
12
CHAPTER II
SHIP SCHEDULING AND NETWORK DESIGN FOR
CARGO ROUTING IN LINER SHIPPING
2.1 Introduction
Sea cargo is the freight carried by ships. Increasing globalization and inter-dependence
of various world economies is leading to a positive growth in the sea cargo industry.
Today, sea carriers offer transportation services on a worldwide basis. Increasing sea-
borne trade (a 3.8% annual growth in 2005) and the increasing size of world fleet (a
7.2% increase in deadweight tons in 2005) offer new challenges and problems for the
planners. Deadweight tons measures the weight of the ship at any loaded condition
minus the weight of the ship with no crew, cargo, fuel etc on board.
Among the different modes of shipping, liner shipping is on a continuous rise. Liner
services carry over 60% of the value of goods shipped by sea [23]. In liner shipping
a carrier decides on a set of voyages, makes the schedule available to shippers and
operates on it. As mentioned in Chapter 1, liner shipping mainly involves carrying
containerized cargo, i.e. the cargo that have been physically and economically stowed
in a container. Containerization of cargo makes the handling of cargo easy, minimizes
port labor and maximizes ship’s capacity utilization. Also, cargo is allowed to travel
on more than one service route before reaching its final destination. A port where
cargo is transferred from one ship to another for further transportation is referred to as
a transshipment port. The number and size of transshipment ports is on a continuous
rise. Further collaboration among liner shipping carriers is very common. Today
smaller alliances are collaborating to form even bigger alliances, for example The
Grand Alliance and The New World Alliance laid down the foundation for cooperating
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in 2006. The trend of consolidating fleets and service routes demands better decision
support systems to control a large fleet of ships and to solve large scale scheduling
and optimization problems.
Liner services involve higher fixed costs and administrative overhead than for ex-
ample tramp shipping because tramps usually wait until they are full before departing
from a port whereas liner services promise to depart on predetermined schedules re-
gardless of whether the ship is full. The number of ships required for a given liner
service route is determined principally by the frequency required on the service route,
the distance travelled by a ship on the route and the speed of the ship. For example,
a weekly liner service between New York and Hamburg may require four ships to
maintain the necessary frequency.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, liner shipping involves decision making at strategic,
tactical and operational planning levels. In the strategic planning stage, the optimal
number and mix of ships in a fleet is determined. Given that owning a ship involves
a huge capital investment (usually in millions of US dollars) and the cost of idling a
2,000TEU ship is $20,000-$25,000 per day, the strategic level decisions are extremely
important. In this chapter, we study the tactical and the operational level decisions.
In the tactical planning stage, the service network is designed by creating the ship
routes, i.e. the sequence of port visits by a given fleet, and the assignment of ships to
these routes. Ships move in cycles from one port to another following the same port
rotation for the entire planning horizon. To maintain a customer base and to provide
customers with a regular schedule most carriers have at-least one departure each week
from each port visited on a service route (i.e. a cycle). This requires that the number
of ships that operate on a cycle be at-least equal to the number of weeks that it takes
to complete the cycle. Some cycles such as those connecting Asia to North America,
may take up to eight weeks to complete, which means that a carrier requires at-least
eight ships to introduce a new service on such a route. The problem of designing the
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service network of a carrier is referred to as the ship scheduling problem.
In the operational planning stage, a carrier makes decisions regarding which cargo
to accept or reject for servicing and which path(s) to use to ship the selected cargo.
This is referred to as the cargo routing problem. A carrier may elect not to transport
some cargo, either because it is not profitable or because there is other cargo, perhaps
at other ports, that is relatively more profitable. A cargo starts its trip from an in-land
location and arrives at its origin port. This network which utilizes trucks, railroads,
or waterways to bring cargo from an inland location to its origin port is known as
the feeder network. Cargo then moves from its origin port to its destination port,
possibly after visiting some intermediate ports. From there it is taken to its final in-
land destination using another feeder network. Some of the intermediate ports that
a cargo visits during its journey from the origin port to the destination port may act
as transshipment ports where cargo is transferred from one ship to another.
The decisions made at one planning level affect the decision making at other
planning levels as well. The decisions at the strategic level set the general policies
and guidelines for the decision making at the tactical and operational levels. Similarly,
the decisions at the tactical level set the capacity limitations and network structure
for the operational planning level. In the reverse direction, the information on cost
and revenue that are generated by the system given the set parameters provides the
much needed feedback for decision making at a higher level.
Over the years, the sea cargo industry has been conservative in terms of adopting
new decision support systems. It has a long tradition of manual planning by expe-
rienced planners. More over, in general ship scheduling involves a large variety of
problems. Hence, mostly tailor made models for specific problems with specialized
constraints and objectives are available in the literature. Furthermore, most of the
available literature have been developed for industrial and tramp shipping ([15]). Be-
cause of the many differences in modelling and problem structure itself, it is difficult
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to draw comparisons between the existing literature. We next briefly overview a set
of representative papers related to container and liner shipping. For a comprehensive
review of literature on ship scheduling and cargo routing we recommend [52] for the
work done before 1983, [53] for the decade 1982-1992 and [15] for the last decade.
[50] provides a nonlinear integer program to maximize total profit by finding an
optimal sequence of ports to visit for each container-ship and an optimal number of
cargo units to be transported between each pair of ports by each ship. They allow
multiple pick ups and delivery on their ships. However, a special network structure
with a restriction on loading and unloading of cargo at the end ports is considered.
Furthermore, the model does not consider transshipments by not allowing cargo to be
carried on ships that do not visit either the port of origin or the port of destination.
They report that their algorithms solve instances with 3 ships and up to 20 ports
within an hour.
[27] considers the liner shipping problem in a special network where all cargo is
transported from a set of production ports to a single depot. The problem is solved
by first generating all feasible single ship routes, and then solving a set partitioning
problem. Again the model does not allow for transshipments. Although a weekly
frequency constraint is imposed on the operated routes, the feasible routes for the
particular problem considered have a maximum route time of one week only. Thus
on any of the feasible routes a single ship can maintain weekly frequency. Instances
with up to 19 ships on a network with up to 40 ports are reported to be solved within
a couple of seconds.
Finally, [49] provides a review of linear and integer programming models, that
only consider the deployment of a fleet of liner ships, with different ship types, on a
set of predetermined routes with targeted service frequencies to minimize operating
and lay-up costs.
As noted earlier, decisions made at one planning level affect decision making
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at other planning levels. Given a fleet size and mix, the service network laid at
the tactical planning level governs which routes can be formed at the operational
planning level to route cargo. The cargo picked at the operational planning level and
the routes selected determine the cost and revenue that can be generated and thus
the profitability of the given service network. These two problems are highly inter-
dependent and thus it is important that they be studied in an integrated framework.
In this chapter, we present a new mixed integer programming (MIP) model for the
integrated ship scheduling and the cargo routing problem for containerized cargo.
We refer to this problem as the simultaneous ship scheduling and the cargo routing
problem. Since the proposed integer program is too large to be solved economically by
general mixed integer programming codes, we develop algorithms to solve it efficiently.
Our model handles many relevant constraints and emerging trends that appear
in practice, but have not been considered previously in the literature. For instance,
customers expect carriers to provide them a regular schedule by maintaining at least
a weekly frequency on the routes they operate on. To the best of our knowledge,
this constraint has not been considered in the literature in its full generality. We
successfully impose the weekly frequency constraint at the ports visited by a carrier.
As is common in container shipping, we allow multiple pickup and delivery on our
ships i.e. we allow containers loaded at one port to have more than one port of
destination. More over, the fleet of a carrier usually consists of various ship types
with different characteristics that may change over time. We consider a heteroge-
neous fleet with ships of different sizes, cost structures and speeds. In the literature,
although there are references (see for example [27]) to models with a heterogeneous
fleet, most of these models consider ships with identical service speeds. Repositioning
of empty containers efficiently is a big problem in liner shipping. Our model with
some modifications has the flexibility to incorporate empty container repositioning.
Empty container repositioning has been studied by [62] and [14] also, however these
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papers consider only the movement of empty containers on a given network. We also
allow for cargo routes to encompass a combination of cycles rather than a single cycle
(with some simplifying assumptions on the cost of transshipment), thus providing
carriers with increased routing opportunities. We are not aware of any earlier results
on transshipment of containers at an intermediate port from one ship to another.
These features allow the use of our model in a wide variety of problem settings.
In the most general approach for solving ship scheduling problems to date, [27]
generates a set of feasible schedules by including non-linear and intricate constraints,
and then solves a set partitioning problem. Our goal in this chapter is to model
the simultaneous ship scheduling and cargo routing problem in its generality and
solve it for large-scale instances. Hence, rather than being limited to an initial set
of routes or exhaustively listing all the routes for ships, we design algorithms that
exploit the separability of the problem to iteratively generate good cycles for ships
and efficiently route the demand. More specifically, we utilize the fact that the ship
scheduling problem can be reduced to a cycle generation problem and the cargo rout-
ing problem can be reduced to a multicommodity flow problem. We develop a greedy
heuristic, a column generation based algorithm and a two phase Benders decompo-
sition based algorithm and compare the computational effectiveness and efficiency of
these approaches.
Our computational results are encouraging and establish that some of the algo-
rithms developed can be used to solve larger instances, as compared to the literature,
in terms of fleet size that arise as a result of collaborations and mergers in the sea
cargo industry. We report computational results on problem instances with up to 100
ships and 20 ports.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces our
notation, mathematical formulation and a note on the complexity of the problem.
Three different algorithms, a greedy heuristic, a column generation based algorithm
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and a Benders decomposition based algorithm, are discussed in Section 2.3. Section
2.4 provides various algorithmic and implementation details. Computational exper-
iments are presented in Section 2.5. Conclusions and directions for future work are
discussed in the final section.
2.2 Problem Description
We now present a mathematical formulation for the simultaneous ship scheduling and
containerized cargo routing problem after introducing our notation and a space-time
network.
Let P denote the set of ports. We will treat demand as a set of commodities with
a positive supply at the origin ports and a positive demand at the destination ports.
Each such commodity is characterized by an origin port, o, a destination port, d, the
day of the week, i, when the supply is available at port o, the maximum demand
(in TEUs) that may arise at port d, D(o,d,i), and the revenue obtained by satisfying
one TEU of the demand, R(o,d,i). We use the triplet (o, d, i) to identify a particular
demand and we let Θ be the set of all such triplets. We call such triplets demand
triplets.
A carrier typically has several different types of ships in his fleet. Each ship type
usually has different capacity and speed and specifies the characteristics of a group
of ships that are considered identical. We denote by A the set of all the ship types
and use the index a to represent a particular ship type. We associate the following
information with each ship type a ∈ A: T a denotes the capacity of a ship in TEUs
for a ship of type a, for p, q ∈ P , la(p,q) denotes the number of days it takes for a ship
of type a to make a sailing from port p to port q and Na denotes the number of ships
of type a available in the given fleet.
Given that the temporal aspects of the problem are important, we formulate the
simultaneous ship scheduling and cargo routing problem as a multicommodity flow
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problem with side constraints on a space-time network. Furthermore, we use days as
our time units in the space-time network, since in general the transoceanic routes do
not visit more than one port in a given day. Let G = (V,E) be a directed space-time
network with vertex set V and edge set E. Each vertex v ∈ V represents a port,
port(v), on a day of the week, time(v). That is, for each port p ∈ P we create seven
vertices in V . For notational convenience, we associate a subscript with each vertex,
i.e. v = v(p,i) where port(v) = p and time(v) = i. We refer to the vertices of G either
by v or v(p,i) depending on the ease of exposition.
The network G = (V,E) contains three types of edges. The first is the set of
ground edges. For every ship type a ∈ A, we construct ground edges by connecting
nodes v(p,i) to v(p,i+1) ∀p ∈ P and 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. We also connect v(p,7) to v(p,1) ∀p ∈ P .
For a ship, these edges represent an over-night stay at a port and for cargo they
represent an overnight stay at a port either on ground, or on the same or on a
different ship before continuing further. Next, for every ship type a ∈ A and pair of
ports p, q ∈ P, we construct voyage edges, (v(p,i), u(q,j))a for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 7 such that
i − j = la(p,q) mod(7). The voyage edges represent the movement of ships and cargo
from one port to another at a given speed. Finally, we create a set of fictitious edges,
(v(d,j), u(o,i)) for all demand triplets (o, d, i) ∈ Θ and 1 ≤ j ≤ 7. An edge (v(d,j), u(o,i))
only allows the flow of commodity (o, d, i) on it and enables us to view the flow of
commodity (o, d, i) in the network as a circulation. Let us denote the set of all ground
edges by Eg, the set of all ground edges for ship type a by E
a
g , the set of all voyage
edges by Ev, the set of all voyage edges for ship type a by E
a
v and the set of all fictitious








v and E = Eg ∪Ev ∪Ef . We also
use the following additional notation: InEdges(v) denotes the set of incoming edges
into vertex v and OutEdges(v) denotes the set of outgoing edges from vertex v; for
an edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, tail(e) denotes vertex u and head(e) denotes vertex v. Figure
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Figure 4: Network with four ports and two cycles
that port C acts as a transshipment port to transport cargo from port A to port D.
The length of voyage edge e = (v, u) ∈ Eav , lae , is equal to the number of days it
takes for a ship of type a to reach from port(v) to port(u). We also let le = 1 for
e ∈ Eg and le = 0 for e ∈ Ef . The capacity of an edge represents the total amount of
flow in TEUs that the edge can sustain. Ground edges at a port may have finite or
infinite capacity depending on whether we wish to impose a limit on the amount of
cargo that can be handled/stored at a port. Capacity on a voyage edge depends on
the number of ships (and their capacities) that cover the edge.
There are various fixed and variable costs associated with the simultaneous ship
scheduling and cargo routing problem. While some of these costs are incurred by
ships, others are incurred by cargo. For the costs related to ports, we let cs,av be the
one-time cost incurred by a ship of type a ∈ A when visiting port(v) and ccv be the
total cost that a TEU of cargo incurs at port(v) per day. The port visit costs may be
different at different ports. Similarly, cs,ae reflects the cost of operating a ship of type
a on edge e in deep sea if e ∈ Eav and the cost of an overnight stay for a ship of type
a at port(head(e)) if e ∈ Eag . For cargo, cce for e ∈ Ev reflects the cost of shipping a
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TEU of cargo on edge e and for e ∈ Eg reflects the cost of storing or holding a TEU
of cargo at port((head(e)). Fictitious edges are assigned zero costs.
We make sure that the port visit cost is incurred only once at each port even if a
ship makes an over-night stay at the port. To account properly for the port visit cost
in the time expanded network, we subtract the port visit cost for ship type a at the
port from the ship cost cs,ae on the ground edge e. Thus if a ship makes an overnight
stay at a port then though the port visit cost is counted twice via the node costs it
is subtracted once via the ground edge cost. Idling of a ship at a port is penalized
by imposing the overnight stay cost on the ship. Long stay of cargo at a port, which
is different from its port of destination, is penalized through the holding cost at the
port. In our model, we use days of the week as the level of time discretization, thus
we assume that if ships on two different cycles meet at a port on the same day then
transshipment can occur in both the directions (i.e. cargo can be transferred from
both the ships on each other). By considering finer discretization of time, one can
account for smaller time windows on which ships at a port meet for transshipments
and to determine if transshipment is possible in only one direction (without incurring
the holding cost).
Given that in the space-time network the level of discretization is in days, a
commodity that becomes available at port o on the ith day of the week is represented
as a supply on vertex v(o,i) in the network. We assume that supply appears at vertex o
(for destination d) at the same day of week every week. We believe assuming that an
average amount of demand arises at a port on a given day is reasonable in our context
since we are considering a tactical model. Since the demand from week to week is
taken to be the same for a carrier, the service characteristics may also remain the
same every week. To this end, we assume that given any cycle, the weekly frequency
on the cycle is maintained using ships from the same fleet. We characterize a cycle
C by the port rotation that it follows, the days of the week it visits each port in its
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rotation, the type of ship that is used to service C and the number of ships LC it
takes to maintain a weekly frequency on C. Due to the indivisibility of ships, LC is
integral by definition. A cycle is said to be feasible if it satisfies pre-specified rules in
terms of the number of ships required to maintain a weekly frequency on the cycle
and the number of ports visited. We denote the set of all feasible cycles for ship type







we represent a cycle C by a sequence of vertices, for example a cycle from vertex v1
to vertex vr via v2, · · · , vr−1 is represented as C = v1 − v2 · · · vr − v1. Cost of a cycle








We now present a mixed integer programming formulation for the simultaneous ship
scheduling and cargo routing problem. Our formulation has two sets of variables.
First, for every feasible cycle C we define a binary variable xC . xC = 1 if a weekly
frequency is maintained on cycle C and is 0 otherwise. The xC variables are taken
to be binary rather than integer as the possibility of departing two ships of same
type from a port following the same port calls on the same days of the week is highly
unlikely.
Next, we define non-negative continuous variables representing the flow on edges.
For each edge e ∈ Eg ∪ Ev and each triplet (o, d, i) ∈ Θ we define f (o,d,i)e to denote
the flow of commodity represented by (o, d, i) on edge e. For a fictitious edge e =
(v(d,j), u(o,i)) ∈ Ef , a single flow variable, f (o,d,i)e , for commodity (o, d, i), is defined
since the flow of other commodities on this edge is not allowed. Note that, we let the
flow variables to be continuous since adjusting for picking a fractional container does
not influence the solution quality very much for the purposes of our tactical model.
Before presenting the model we summarize the following additional assumptions
that we make. A1-A3 are for the clarity of exposition and in no way restrict the
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usability of our model, however assumption A4 is more significant. (A1) Capacity
on ground edges is assumed to be infinite i.e. we do not put any restriction on the
amount of cargo that can be handled/stored at a port. (A2) We assume that all costs
on cargo can be modelled via edge costs i.e. we set ccv = 0 ∀v ∈ V . (A3) We assume
that all cargo is available in identical 1 TEU containers. Thus, D(o,d,i) represents
the number of containers of a commodity required at port d that become available
at port o on day i of the week. (A4) Finally, we do not consider the costs involved
with transferring cargo from one ship to another. As discussed before, cargo incurs
holding costs whenever it stays at a port overnight. To account for transshipment
costs correctly we need to distinguish between the capacity provided by different
cycles on the same edge of the network. If the edges are duplicated for all the feasible
cycles it will increase the size of the graph tremendously. Thus, it is hard to account
correctly for transshipment costs if the network is not known (i.e. the cycles to be
operated have not been selected). Since our aim is to consider the network design
and cargo routing problems simultaneously and generate feasible cycles as a sub-
problem, we ignore the transshipment costs for now. In Section 2.5.4 we present a
computational study to discuss the effects of transshipment costs on cargo routing
decisions once a set of cycles, to be operated by the given fleet, has been selected.
The simultaneous ship scheduling and cargo routing problem can be formulated










































≤ D(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ (4)∑
C∈Ca
LCxC ≤ Na ∀a ∈ A (5)
xC ∈ {0, 1} ∀C ∈ Ca ,∀a ∈ A (6)
f (o,d,i)e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ. (7)
We now explain the above formulation. The objective function (1) maximizes the
net profit by subtracting the sum of operating costs from the revenue generated. The
first term in the objective function denotes the total revenue generated by transport-
ing cargo between various origin and destination pairs. The second term captures the
cost incurred by cargo during its routing from the origin port to the destination port.
The third term denotes the total cost of operating ships on the selected cycles.
Constraint (2) is a flow balance constraint at every vertex of the space-time net-
work. It ensures that the total flow into vertex v, of each commodity (o, d, i) ∈ Θ, is
equal to the total flow out of it for the same commodity. Constraints (3) and (4) are
capacity constraints on the edges. Constraint (3) requires that the total flow on a
voyage edge must be less than the sum of the capacities of ships servicing that edge.
Constraint (4) models that the total flow of a given commodity from an origin port
to a destination port must be less than the demand at the destination port. Note
that we do not have a capacity constraint on ground edges because of assumption A1.
Constraint (5) requires that for each fleet type, we do not use more ships than we
have available. Note that if cycle C ∈ Ca is selected, i.e. xC = 1, then it will utilize
LC ships of type a to maintain a weekly frequency. Finally, (6) denotes xC as binary
variables and (7) denotes f
(o,d,i)
e as non-negative continuous flow variables.
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2.2.2 Hardness of the Problem
The decision version of the simultaneous ship scheduling and cargo routing problem
is in NP, that is given a set of cycles to be operated and a flow of cargo on the edges it
can be determined in polynomial time whether the total revenue generated is greater
than a given constant K. We show the NP completeness of the problem by reducing a
well known NP-complete problem, 0-1 Knapsack, into a simultaneous ship scheduling
and cargo routing problem.
The decision version of the 0-1 Knapsack problem is defined as the following:
Given set N = {1, 2, · · ·n}, integers K, ci and wi for every i ∈ N is there a subset S
of N such that
∑
i∈S




Theorem 1. The decision version of the simultaneous ship scheduling and cargo
routing problem is NP-complete.
Proof. Suppose there are W identical ships with capacity T TEUs each. Construct a
sea cargo network as follows. For each i ∈ {1, 2 · · ·n} construct two ports, a demand
port(di) with demand ciTEUs and an origin port (oi). Let a ship in the fleet take
wi
2
weeks to make a sailing from port oi to port di. Assume symmetric distances between
ports and that the distances between oi and dj, ∀1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n is large. Thus wi ships
are needed to maintain weekly frequencies on cycles Ci = oi − di − oi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and all other cycles are infeasible. Let T = maxi∈N ci and let revenue generated by
satisfying unit demand between any o− d pair be 1. Assume there are no operating
costs involved. Observe that :
• All feasible cycles are disjoint.
• A cycle Ci needs wi ships to maintain weekly frequency and can generate ci
units of revenue.
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• If a set S ⊂ N of cycles is chosen to be serviced then
∑
i∈S
wi ≤ W and a total of∑
i∈S
ci units of revenue is generated.
It follows easily now that a set of chosen cycles, S, will give a revenue of K units
or more if and only if the 0-1 Knapsack problem has a feasible solution. Thus the 0-1
Knapsack can be solved by solving a SSSCR problem.
2.3 Solution Methodology
The linear program given by (1)-(7) contains a large number of variables even for
moderate size problems. The large size of the model is a direct result of the exponen-
tial number of possible feasible cycles. Furthermore, each demand triplet adds a set
of flow variables to the MIP model. An interesting observation however is that if we
determine the set of cycles to be operated for each fleet type, i.e. given non-negative
values xC satisfying fleet availability constraints (5), model (1)-(7) reduces to the
following multicommodity flow problem where each demand triplet is considered as a
different commodity.



































≤ D(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ (11)
f (o,d,i)e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ. (12)
Note that (8)-(41) is a linear program with no integrality constraints as it only
involves the flow variables f
(o,d,i)
e . Let π = {π(o,d,i)v : π(o,d,i)v unrestricted, ∀v ∈
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Figure 5: Outline of the three algorithms considered.
0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ} be the set of dual variables associated with constraints (9), (10) and
(11) respectively.
Next, we present three heuristic algorithms that exploit the above observation to
solve the SSSCR problem. First, we provide a simple greedy heuristic that selects
good cycles one by one and then assigns cargo to routes. Then we present a column
generation based algorithm that generates a pool of good cycles and then selects the
best cycles among these while also routing cargo in the network. Finally we present
the details of a more involved Benders decomposition based algorithm. Figure 5
presents an outline of the three algorithms.
2.3.1 Greedy Algorithm
Let S represent the set of cycles that are in operation i.e. ships have been assigned to
maintain weekly frequencies on cycles in set S. The desirability or the value of cycle
C depends on the revenue generated by routing flow on ships employed in C, the
number of ships required to maintain weekly frequency on C and the various costs
involved in operating the cycle C. The marginal value of cycle C also depends on
the cycles already present in set S. Thus, a greedy selection of cycles must take into
account the set of existing operational cycles and demand triplets (o, d, i) ∈ Θ.
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Let Aa, ∀a ∈ A, represent the number of ships of type a that are currently
available. The greedy algorithm starts with an empty set of selected cycles. To
find profitable cycles an auxiliary network Ga = (V a, Ea) is created utilizing dual
information from the solution of the MCF problem to assign edge costs. Ga is
constructed for each ship type a such that V a = V and Ea = Eav ∪ Eag . Each edge
e ∈ Ea is assigned a cost ce = cs,ae + λe and each vertex v ∈ V a is assigned a cost
cv = c
s,a
v . For every ship type, the algorithm then finds a minimum cost cycle in the
auxiliary network by using a procedure FindCycle(Ga). Details of this procedure
will be provided in Section 2.4. Finally, if feasible the cycle with minimum cost is
selected and a suitable number of ships, to maintain weekly frequency, is assigned to
it. The process is repeated while there are ships to be assigned.
2.3.2 Column Generation Based Algorithm
Though the greedy algorithm is simple and provides a feasible solution quickly it is
not very effective. It works with a very small set of feasible cycles and once a feasible
cycle is generated it is picked in the final solution without any further considerations.
Next we propose a column generation based algorithm that iteratively generates a
good pool of profitable cycles for solving the linear programming (LP) relaxation of
(1)-(7).
Column generation is an effective way of solving linear programs with a large
number of columns (see [11] for an introduction). Rather than enumerating all the
columns explicitly, it begins by solving a restricted problem (called the master prob-
lem) with a select set of columns. A subproblem is solved to generate “attractive”
columns and they are subsequently added to the master problem. The process is re-
peated until no further profitable columns can be generated. The column generation
technique has been successfully used to solve many large scale optimization problems,
please see ([7]) for an example in solving airline crew assignment problems.
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To solve the LP relaxation of SSSCR, the master problem in the column genera-
tion is initialized by restricting the set of cycle selection variables, to one simple cycle
for every demand triplet. At every step of the column generation process, the master
problem is solved to find the best value for all the decision variables. The pricing
subproblem for the column generation is equivalent to identifying negative cost cycles
in an auxiliary network, for every ship type. The auxiliary network, Ga = (V a, Ea) is
constructed for each ship type a such that V a = V and Ea = Eav ∪Eag . Dual variable
values from the master problem are used to assign costs to the edges and the vertices
of the auxiliary network. Each edge e ∈ Ea is assigned a cost ce = cs,ae + T aλe + le7 σ
a
and each vertex v ∈ V a is assigned a cost cv = cs,av so that negative cost cycles in
Ga correspond to columns with positive reduced costs in the master problem. Note
that since SSSCR is a maximization problem, profitable columns are the ones with
positive reduced cost. Procedure FindCycle(Ga) (described in Section 2.4) is used
to identify negative cost cycles in the auxiliary network and corresponding columns
are added to the master problem. The process is continued until no new cycles can
be found. Finally, integrality constraints are imposed on the cycle selection vari-
ables and a branch-and-bound framework is used to obtain an integer solution for
the SSSCR problem. No new columns are generated during the branch-and-bound
phase. Different branching rules, with different advantages, can be devised to obtain
the integer solution. For example branching on the largest feasible cycle forces many
other binary variables also to satisfy the integrality constraints. However, we use the
variable that affects the solution quality the most as the variable to branch on, giving
preference to the up (xC = 1) branch, because this strategy performed the best in
our computational experiments.
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2.3.3 Benders Decomposition Based Algorithm
As the number of ports, ships and demand triplets increase, solving model (1)-(7) by
column generation becomes increasingly difficult. The number of constraints as well
as the number of variables increase with the increase in the number of ports, ships
and demand triplets, in the column generation master problem. We next decompose
the LP relaxation of the model (1)-(7) using Benders decomposition to obtain a pair
of problems that utilize the separability of SSSCR. The decomposition results in a
master problem, where the number of variables increases as the number of cycles
increase, and a subproblem, where the number of constraints increases as the number
of demand triplets increase. Thus the effect of the increase in problem size is divided
between a master problem and a subproblem. Further, this decomposition is used
to effectively solve the LP relaxation and the solution is embedded in a branch-and-
bound approach to obtain an integer solution.
Benders decomposition ([10]) is a popular technique to solve mixed integer linear
programming problems with linking constraints. This approach is useful when master
problem has all the integer variables and it is difficult to treat them in sub-problems.
The solution process iterates between an integer master problem, which passes on the
value of integer variables to subproblem(s), and subproblems generate cuts (feasibility
and optimality) which are passed back to the master problem. Though this approach
has proved to be suitable for many problems it has the drawback that an integer
master problem has to be solved at each iteration. [43] proposed a modification to
this approach in which the solution of a sequence of integer programs is replaced by
the solution of a sequence of linear programs and a few integer programs.
The basic techniques of [43] and its modifications have been used successfully to
solve many hard problems. [28] used it for solving an engine scheduling problem
and [66] used it for solving a time-dependent travelling salesman problem. More
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recently, these techniques have been used successfully to solve locomotive car assign-
ment ([17], [18]) and aircraft routing and crew scheduling ([19]) problems. For these
problems enormous time reductions and significant improvements in solution quality
were achieved by first relaxing the integrality constraints in the master problem. Af-
ter the relaxation is solved, to acceptable time or optimality criteria, the integrality
constraints are introduced back in the master problem. We now present the use of
Benders decomposition method to solve the SSSCR problem.
2.3.3.1 Benders reformulation
As noted earlier for given non-negative values xC satisfying fleet constraints (5), the
LP relaxation of model (1)-(7) reduces to the MCF . Since MCF is a multicommodity
flow problem with no integrality constraints, the optimal value of MCF problem is
equal to the optimal value of its dual. The dual problem (DP ) of the MCF problem
can be written as
















tail(e) + λe ≥ −c
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(o,d,i) ≥ R(o,d,i) − cce ∀e ∈ Ef , ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ (15)
π(o,d,i)v unrestricted, ∀v ∈ V, ∀ (o, d, i) ∈ Θ (16)
λe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ Ev (17)
ω(o,d,i) ≥ 0 ∀ (o, d, i) ∈ Θ. (18)
Let D be the feasible region of the dual problem and PD and QD be the set of
extreme points and extreme rays of D, respectively. Note that D does not depend
on xC . Also, since R
(o,d,i) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ and cce = 0 ∀e ∈ Ef , a feasible solution
for the dual subproblem is π
(o,d,i)
v = 0 ∀ v ∈ V, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ, λe = 0 ∀ e ∈ Ev
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and ω(o,d,i) = R(o,d,i) ∀ (o, d, i) ∈ Θ, and thus D 6= ∅. Now, by strong duality, either
the MCF problem is infeasible or it is feasible and bounded. Clearly the null vector
0 is a feasible solution for MCF . This means that the primal-dual pair of MCF
and DP is feasible and bounded. Thus the optimal value of MCF and DP can be















Introducing an additional free variable z, model (1)-(7) can be reformulated as
the following Benders master problem (BMP). This problem has integer variables xC
and one free continuous variable z.



















CostCxC ∀(λ, ω) ∈ PD (20)∑
C∈Ca
LCxC ≤ Na ∀ a ∈ A (21)
xC ∈ {0, 1} (22)
z free. (23)
Note that we do not have any feasibility constraints in the Benders master problem
because (DP) is bounded. The optimality constraints (20) ensure that z is restricted
to be smaller than or equal to the value of the right hand side of constraint (20)
at various extreme points of DP . In general, the above model contains many more
constraints than the LP relaxation of model (1)-(7) but most of them are inactive
at optimality. Thus a natural approach to solve (19)-(23) is by dropping constraints
(20) and generating them as needed. We now present the basic Benders algorithm
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to solve the linear relaxation of SSSCR problem to optimality. Later, integrality
constraints are introduced to solve the original SSSCR problem. We denote the
linear relaxation of BMP as LPBMP and the relaxation of LPBMP obtained by
dropping constraints (20) as the RLPBMP .
2.3.3.2 Overview of the algorithm
The basic Benders decomposition based algorithm for solving the LP relaxation
of SSSCR iteratively selects good cycles, by solving the RLPBMP , for the ship
scheduling problem and then efficiently solves the cargo routing problem, by solving
the MCF problem. The MCF problem utilizes the RLPBMP solution to assign
capacity to voyage edges before solving the flow problem. In return, at each iteration,
the dual solution of the MCF problem provides an optimality cut to the RLPBMP .
Let t be the iteration number and P tD be the restricted set of extreme points of D
available at iteration t, i.e. the RLPBMP at iteration t is obtained from LPBMP
by replacing PD by P
t
D in (20). Note that the solution of the RLPBMP at each
iteration t, denoted by zt, provides an upper bound for the original LPBMP (since
the RLPBMP has fewer constraints than the LPBMP ).
Algorithm 1 The basic Benders decomposition based algorithm
Procedure Basic Benders()
Set t = 1, P tD = ∅, lower bound = 0, upper bound =∞.
while (upper bound > lower bound+ ε ) do
STEP 1. SOLV E the RLPBMP to obtain solution zt and {xC}t.
Set upper bound = zt.
STEP 2. Solve the MCF problem taking {xC}t as input to obtain v({xC}t) and
optimal dual solution (π, λ, ω).






















t = t+ 1.
end while
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The original BMP (or SSSCR) problem with integrality constraints is solved
heuristically in two phases. In Phase I, all integrality constraints are relaxed and
the LPBMP is solved to optimality by using basic Benders decomposition algorithm
(Algorithm 1). Since the set of feasible cycles can be exponential, the RLPBMP ,
in this phase, is solved in a column generation setting. For phase I, SOLV E in
Algorithm 1 refers to this column generation and its details will be provided next.
Retaining all optimality cuts and cycles generated in the first phase, Phase II
puts the integrality constraints back on the master problem. Algorithm 1 is started
once more, however in this phase the RLPBMP in Step 1 is replaced with the mixed
integer program BMP , together with the cuts and cycles generated in the first phase.
Since theDP polytope is not affected by the integrality constraints, all optimality cuts
generated in Phase I can be used to generate corresponding cuts for the mixed integer
program in Phase II. Additional optimality cuts are generated at each iteration. Note
however that in phase II Algorithm 1 in Step 1 solves an integer problem at every
iteration. Thus in Phase II no new cycles are generated and SOLV E simply refers
to a branch-and-bound solution of the relaxed BMP . This two phase approach for
solving integer programs using Benders decomposition was originally proposed by [43]
and the intuition behind it is the hope that many of the necessary constraints for the
master problem may be generated by solving a linear program in place of the more
computationally expensive integer program.
The branch-and-bound tree in Phase II is searched by a depth first search, giving
preference to the up (xC = 1) branch. As in Section 2.3.2, the variable that affects
the solution quality the most is chosen as the branching variable. Note that solving
the mixed integer program in BMP is a computationally expensive step. Since any
feasible integer solution can be used to generate an optimality cut, the mixed integer
program BMP does not need to be solved to optimality at every iteration. However,
if the BMP is solved heuristically the upper bound it provides during the Benders
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iterations could be much smaller than the true upper bound which might lead to a
premature termination of the algorithm. In the worst case, the upper bound could
become smaller than the lower bound. To avoid such a premature termination of the
algorithm, the branch-and-bound search is terminated only when the solution quality
obtained reaches an acceptable optimality gap (the gap between the best integer
objective and the objective of the best node remaining). Searching the branch-and-
bound tree for a solution with small optimality gap is likely to take large computation
time but it is also likely to provide better solution quality by providing better bounds
for the Benders iterations. Thus, a suitable optimality gap must be chosen to avoid
the premature termination of the algorithm and to keep it computationally efficient.
2.3.3.3 Column generation for solving the RLPBMP
The master problem in the Benders decomposition (the RLPBMP in Algorithm
1) is solved in a column generation setting. The pricing subproblem in the column
generation reduces to identifying negative cost cycles in an auxiliary network, Ga =
(V a, Ea), for every ship type a. As before, Ga is constructed such that V a = V and
Ea = Eav ∪ Eag . We next present how we compute the costs on the vertices and the
edges of network Ga.
Let Π(λ,ω) and σ
a denote the dual variables corresponding to constraint (20) and









Note that in (24) the second summation is only over the voyage edges of cycle
C. Since the ground edges have infinite capacity, at optimality, by complementary
slackness conditions λe = 0 ∀e ∈ Eg. Thus, ground edges can also be included in the
summation in (24). From LP theory, we know that if the reduced cost cC ≤ 0 for
each cycle C ∈ Ca and every fleet type a ∈ A then we have the optimal solution to
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our problem. That is the column generation iterates as long as there exists a cycle












































σa < 0. (25)



















cs,ae to every edge e ∈ Ea.
Let, CostC represents the cost of cycle C with the above cost structure. Let dCostCe











. Note that, since
dxe ≥ x, if the optimal value of the pricing subproblem ∀ a ∈ A is greater than
zero then there are no more profitable cycles because CostC ≥ 0 ⇒ dCostCe ≥ 0. If
however, the optimal value of the pricing subproblem for some a ∈ A is less than zero
than we need to check if dCostCe < 0. If it is, then we have found a profitable cycle,
otherwise either there are no more profitable cycles to be added or profitable cycles
have very low negative cost (> −1) and are therefore ignored. We use Procedure
FindCycle(Ga) (as will be described in Section 2.4) to identify negative cost cycles
in Ga.
2.4 Algorithmic Issues
In this section we discuss several algorithmic ideas we utilize to make our algorithms
more effective, efficient, and stable.
37
2.4.1 Solving the Pricing Subproblem
The pricing subproblems for both the column generation and Benders decomposition
based algorithms reduce to finding profitable cycles in the auxiliary network Ga. Sim-
ilarly, the Greedy algorithm needs to find profitable cycles in the auxiliary network.
It is tempting to solve directly a minimum cost circulation problem in the network
Ga, to identify negative cost cycles. However, the cycles obtained by decomposing
the solution of the circulation problem into simple cycles are not guaranteed to be
practical. For example, our initial computational experiments with the circulation
problem suggest that most of the cycles thus generated are too long and require a large
number of ships to maintain weekly frequency. Hence, we first discuss rules based on
the real world practice of liner shipping companies for defining feasible cycles. Next,
a recursive algorithm, FindCycle(G), is presented to efficiently find negative cost
cycles, satisfying pre-defined feasibility conditions, in a given network G.
2.4.1.1 Defining feasible cycles
To solve the pricing subproblem to optimality one must consider all sequences of
ports as candidates for possible profitable cycles. However, searching for negative
cost cycles in such an unconstrained manner not only makes our algorithms inefficient
by generating cycles that create undesirable effects such as large integrality gaps but
also it generates cycles that would never be operated in practice. Hence we impose a
set of constraints that a cycle must satisfy to qualify as a feasible cycle.
Global carriers operate in different regions, for example OOCL operates mainly in
North America, Europe and Asia, and cater to the demand of various markets, such
as trans-Atlantic, trans-Pacific, intra-Asia, and Asia-Europe trade routes. Figure 6
represents an Asia-Europe cycle for OOCL. For a carrier it is important to tap the
benefits of both inter-region and intra-region markets. Whereas, some of the inter-
region markets, for example the trans-Pacific, are the most profitable ones, some of
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Figure 6: An Asia-Europe cycle for OOCL. Source: OOCL
the intra-region markets, for example the intra-Asia market, form the backbone of
international shipping.
We considered the published cycles by [47] and [6] in trans-Pacific and intra-Asia
trade routes to come up with the following guidelines for defining the set of feasible
cycles distributed in two regions, ri and rj.
1. The number of ports visited by a cycle must not be too high. Most of the
current trans-Pacific cycles visit up to 10-15 ports and intra-Asia cycles visit
up to 7-10 ports. Let R(ri,rj) denote the maximum number of ports that a cycle
visiting region ri and rj is allowed to visit.
2. The length (in weeks) of a cycle must be bounded by a suitable number, i.e. the
number of ships that can be committed to a particular cycle are limited. Most
of the trans-Pacific cycles are up to 15 weeks long and most of the intra-Asia
cycles are up to 6 weeks long. Let L(ri,rj) be the maximum allowed length in
weeks for a cycle visiting region ri and rj.
3. Cycles that operate in multiple regions must enter and leave a region only
once, i.e. no inter-region loops are allowed. However, 1-2 intra-region loops are
allowed.
4. Each cycle must directly (without using capacity on other cycles) serve the
origin and destination ports of at least one demand triplet. It is highly unlikely
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for a carrier to introduce a cycle that does not satisfy any demand directly.
2.4.1.2 Finding negative cost feasible cycles
Incorporating any of the rules that guide the feasibility of a cycle into the circulation
problem yields a NP hard problem. (This is easily seen from the fact that shortest
weight-constrained path problem is NP complete ([29]).) Furthermore, an exhaustive
enumeration of cycles following the above rules still yields a large number of cycles.
For ports distributed in two regions, up to 10,000 cycles for a 10 port, 30 demand
triplets problem, over a million cycles for a 15 port, 50 demand triplets problem and
more than 10 million cycles for a 20 port, 80 demand triplets problem exist.
We now describe an iterative search algorithm for constrained negative cycle de-
tection which yields good computational results. In essence, the algorithm utilizes
Lemma (1) due to [40] to prune the search tree by ignoring paths with non-negative
costs. This pruning helps the algorithm to maintain time- and space-efficiency. [4]
have used lemma (1) to develop a similar algorithm for detecting subset disjoint
negative cycles.
Lemma 1. For a negative cost (directed) cycle C = v1−v2− ....−vr−v1 there exists
a node vh in C such that each partial (directed) path vh − vh+1, vh − vh+1 − vh+2,
vh − vh+1 − vh+2 − ... (where indices are modulo r) is a negative cost (directed) path.
We now present a cycle generation algorithm for ports distributed in two regions:
r1 and r2. Note that these ideas can easily be carried over to ports distributed in more
than two regions. Before presenting the algorithm we define some notation. With each
directed path p, we associate the following information: head(p) and tail(p) denote
the last node and first node on p. Cost(p) denotes the cost of path p. NRr1(p)
and NRr2(p) denote the number of ports from region r1 and r2, ER(p) denotes the
number of inter-region edges and finally l(p) denotes the length of path p. Note that
each edge in the network is either between two nodes of the same region (intra-region
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edge) or between two nodes of different regions (inter-region edge) and that the set
{NRr1(p), NRr2(p), ER(p)} completely describes the region(s) visited by a path p.
For a path p we denote the set {head(p), tail(p), ER(p)} as DSet(p). We say that a
path p dominates another path q if DSet(p) = DSet(q) and Cost(p) < Cost(q).
Note that a cycle can be obtained by connecting the endpoints of a path. Lemma
(1) suggests that to find negative cost cycles it is enough to consider paths with
negative cost. Further, the above definition of dominance suggests that among the
paths with the same DSet() only the path with the least cost needs to be explored
further. A path p is said to be feasible if it has negative cost and if it can be extended
to form a feasible cycle. Let Pk denote the set of all non-dominated, feasible paths
with k nodes.
For each ship type a, Algorithm (2) detects negative cost cycles in the auxiliary
network Ga, described earlier with various cost structures. It works inductively by
constructing set Pk+1 from the set Pk. For each path p ∈ Pk it examines if the path
can be extended by adding a single edge to form path p′, that is if path p′ is feasible.
Procedure if feasible path(p) checks for the feasibility of path p depending on the
region(s) visited by p, by ensuring that the guidelines set in Section 2.4.1.1 are met,
and accounts for the fact that for a ship type a no cycle can be longer than Na, number
of available ships for ship type a, weeks. The path is then checked for dominance in
Pk+1, using procedure if dominated(p
′, Pk+1) and non-dominated paths are added to
Pk+1. For a cycle C, procedure if feasible cycle(C) checks if the cycle C is feasible.
For a path p all information can be maintained in O(1) time. For example, to
maintain ER(p), we assign a value 0 to all intra-region edges and value 1 to inter-
region edges. Thus whenever an edge is appended to a path p ∈ Pk to obtain path
p′ ∈ Pk+1, ER(p′) can be obtained by adding the value of the appended edge to
ER(p). Since we maintain all information regarding the region(s) visited by a path,
feasibility check for a path and a cycle can be done in constant time. To check the
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dominance of a path p ∈ Pk, we first need to check if there exists a path q ∈ Pk such
that DSet(p) = DSet(q). This is a computationally expensive step. We use standard
hashing techniques to efficiently detect paths with the same DSet. Once such a path
is found, dominance can be checked in O(1) time. Note that at any given time, set
Pk will contain only one path with a particular DSet, i.e. the non-dominated path.
Rather than storing only the most negative cycle C∗ Algorithm (2) can easily be
modified to maintain a pre-defined number of best cycles.
Algorithm 2 An iterative constrained negative cycle detection algorithm
Procedure FindCycles(Ga)
for all e ∈ Ea do
p = {e}
if if feasible path(p) then P1 = P1 ∪ {p}
end for
k = 1, C∗ = ∅, CostC∗ = 0
while k < R do
while Pk 6= ∅ do
Remove a path p from Pk
Connect the ends of path p to form cycle C.
if if feasible cycle(C) and CostC < CostC∗ then C
∗ = C
for all {(head(p), j) ∈ OutEdges(head(p))} do
p′ = p ∪ {(head(p), j)}
if {if feasible path(p′)} then
Pk+1 = Pk+1 ∪ {p′}






2.4.2 Choosing an Initial Set of Cuts
Even though the Benders decomposition based Algorithm (1) may be initialized with
an empty set of extreme points, the choice of an initial set may affect its convergence.





v = 0 ∀v ∈ V, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ, λe = 0 ∀e ∈ E and ω(o,d,i) = R(o,d,i)
∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ is a feasible but not necessarily an extreme point solution of the DP










The above cut is equivalent to adding the constraint that the value of the optimal
solution must be less than or equal to the revenue that can be generated by satisfying
all the available demand minus the cost of operating the picked cycles.
Similarly, λe = max
(o,d,i)∈Θ
R(o,d,i) ∀e ∈ E and ω(o,d,i) = 0∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ is a feasible


















2.4.3 Making Column Generation Effective
While performing column generation, both in the pure column generation based al-
gorithm for SSSCR and for solving the RLPBMP in Benders decomposition based
algorithm, we identify and add more than one profitable column per iteration. During
the iterative cycle generation instead of maintaining just the most negative cycle we
maintain a set of 5 − 10 most profitable cycles at almost no extra cost. This helps
to significantly reduce the numbers of iterations during column generation without
substantially increasing the time taken per iteration.
During a typical column generation, the problem keeps growing as the column
generation process keeps adding columns to the master problem. To keep the list of
columns manageable, we frequently delete nonbasic columns with high negative re-
duced cost from the master problem. This reduces the time per iteration significantly,
though it increases the number of iterations slightly in many cases. As another speed
up for the column generation process, if no new cycle is detected for a ship type in
an iteration then cycle generation for that ship type is suspended for 2-5 iterations.
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2.5 Computational Experiments
In this section, we present the results of our computational study after describing
the schema employed for generating test cases. We first establish the dominance of
the Benders decomposition based algorithm over the greedy heuristic and the column
generation based algorithm. Next, we present a deeper analysis of the Benders decom-
position based algorithm. Finally, we discuss some of the interesting characteristics of
the solutions obtained by our algorithm and show that it supports the recent trends
observed in the sea-cargo industry. All of our algorithms were implemented in C++
in an Unix environment and we made extensive use of the callable libraries in CPLEX
9.0. All computational experiments were performed on a Sun280R workstation with
UltraSparc-III processor. All times are reported in minutes.
2.5.1 Data Generation
We performed our computational experiments on networks with ports distributed in
two regions. Each generated port is randomly assigned to one of the two regions, with
equal probability, and the sailing distance between ports are chosen to represent the
sailing distance between ports distributed in the Asia and the North-America regions.
Typically, as observed from [47] and [6] service networks, intra-region sailing times
for ports in Asia and North-America are 2-30 days whereas the inter-region sailing
times are 14-42 days.
Origin-destination pairs are chosen randomly from the pairs of ports. Day of the
week on which supply arises at the origin port is assumed to be the same every week
and is chosen uniformly at random from the seven days of a week. The demand
sizes are randomly generated from the interval 0.1 to 1.0 times the capacity of the
largest ship available. Similar proportions are used in [27] and it is suggested that this
represents the demand sizes observed by a liner shipping company. Revenue generated
by satisfying demand for a given demand triplet (o, d, i) is chosen to be in direct
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proportion to the distance between port o and port d, i.e. more revenue is generated
by satisfying a demand at a port in North-America from a port in Asia as compared
to satisfying a demand between two ports in North-America. The proportionality
constant is chosen randomly from [100, 200].
Since the fleet of a carrier usually consists of ships of different types we considered
three different ship types in our fleet. The three ship types have capacity 2000 TEU,
4000 TEU and 8000 TEU. [9] and [35] suggest that ships with 2000 TEU and 4000
TEU capacity are currently in use. According to [47], OOCL has ships of different
types with capacity varying from 2,500TEU to 8,063TEU. A recent increase in liter-
ature regarding the viability of larger ships, [35], points towards the increasing use of
big ships and [9] suggests that ships of up to 8000+ TEUs are in design.
There are various fixed and variable costs involved in shipping a cargo. As in
[16] we do not consider the daily running costs including cost of capital, personnel,
insurance etc. since they are fixed during the planning period. However, we consider
various operational costs that effect a carrier’s decision regarding which ports to visit
and which cycles to operate on. For every ship type, a ∈ A, and for all the ports,
v ∈ P, we consider a port visit cost incurred by a ship of type a if it visits port v.
At a port p, port visit cost for a ship is proportional to the capacity of the ship i.e.
a ship with 8000 TEU capacity incurs a higher port visit cost as compared to a 2000
TEU capacity ship. At every port, v ∈ P , we consider a per unit cargo per night
holding cost. This cost is incurred by a unit of cargo if it is held at a port for one
night and is assumed to be the same for all cargo types. At a port, holding cost per
unit cargo is chosen to be considerably smaller than the port visit cost for a ship. For
every ship type, a ∈ A, and for every pair of ports, {u, v}, we consider the operation
cost for sailing a ship from port u to v. The operation cost depends on the type of
ship that is used for the sailing and is proportional to the distance between the ports.
We generate various classes of random instances, utilizing the above schema, to
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test the robustness of our algorithm. Classes are characterized by specifying the
number of ports (P ), the number of ships (S) and the number of demand triplets
(D). For example, an instance with 6 ports, 30 ships and 18 demand triplets is
represented as P6S30D18. We tested our algorithm on networks with 6, 10, 15 and
20 ports to be serviced. In each of the test classes 20-30 % of all pairs of ports are
considered to be origin destination pairs. A fleet size of up to 100 ships is scheduled.
Grand Alliance which is one of world’s largest alliances has a fleet of 100 ships and
[6] has a fleet of more than 80 container ships. For each test class, results reported
in this section were obtained by generating 5 random instances and then taking an
average over them.
To report the results of our computational study in tabular form we use the
following abbreviations:
• G: The greedy algorithm.
• C: The pure column generation based algorithm.
• B: The two phase Benders decomposition based algorithm where column gen-
eration is used for solving the master problem in Phase I.
• F : The cycle generation algorithm based on the flow decomposition of the
circulation problem.
• I: The cycle generation algorithm based on the iterative search algorithm.
Combination of these are used to represent the overall algorithm tested. For exam-
ple, the two phase Benders decomposition based algorithm with the iterative search
algorithm for cycle generation is represented by BI.
2.5.2 Effectiveness of the Algorithms
We now compare the Benders decomposition based algorithm with the other pro-
posed algorithms. While solving the problem with the pure column generation based
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algorithm the LP relaxation is first solved to optimality and then the integer solution
is obtained using branch-and-bound. However, while solving the problem with the
two phase Benders decomposition based algorithm, in Phase I the cuts are generated
until the relative difference between the upper bound provided by the Benders re-
laxed master problem and the lower bound provided by the subproblem is less than
1% or the number of iterations in the first phase of Benders are less than 200. Phase
I terminates when one of these criteria is met. The LP solution obtained by the pure
column generation based algorithm is used as an upper bound to estimate the quality
of the final integer solution.
Table 6 presents a comparison between the greedy algorithm, the pure column
generation based algorithm and the Benders decomposition based algorithm. It also
compares the flow decomposition based cycle generation algorithm with the iterative
search algorithm for cycle generation. The second and third column of Table 6 report
the number of cycles generated and the CPU time taken to solve the problem using
greedy algorithm with iterative cycle generation. The fourth and fifth column report
these statistics for the pure column generation based algorithm with iterative cycle
generation. The next four columns, two each, report the corresponding statistics for
the Benders decomposition based algorithms with algorithm F and algorithm I for
cycle generation, respectively. The last three columns report the gap corresponding
to the relative difference between the solution value of the GI and the BI algorithm,
the CI and the BI algorithm and the BF and the BI algorithm, respectively. Initial
cuts described in Section 2.4.2 are used in both of the Benders decomposition based
algorithms. Also, columns with reduced cost less than -1,000,000 are removed after
every 10 iterations, during the column generation phase in algorithm C and while
solving the master problem in Phase I of algorithm B. As discussed at the end of
Section 2.3.3.2, care must be taken in setting the stopping conditions for the mixed
integer program BMP in Phase II of the Benders decomposition based algorithm.
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In our computational experiments, stopping the MIP when a 1% optimality gap
for small instances (6-10 ports) and a 3-5% gap for large instances (15-20 ports) is
reached provided a good balance of computational time and solution quality. These
parameters were set after initial computational experiments. Specifically, for the
6 port instances when the optimality gap is reduced from 1% to 0.1%, the solution
quality improves by only ∼ 0.04% whereas the time taken to solve the integer program
increases by ∼ 55%. Hence we believe that heuristically solving the MIP’s did not
have a significant effect in prematurely terminating the Benders algorithm if the
optimality gap was chosen properly. Also, in our computations when we use the
above optimality gaps as stopping criterions we never ran into a situation where
the upper bound obtained by the MIP was less than the Benders lower bound. For
the CI, BF and BI algorithms, column # cycles reports the number of cycles in
the integer program. Note that in these algorithms a larger number of cycles are
generated during column generation, while solving the LP, but subsequently removed
if they have high negative reduced cost.
The results of our tests show that there is a very significant difference in the so-
lution quality obtained by the greedy algorithm and the solution quality obtained
by the other two algorithms. Though the greedy heuristic is fast, it works with a
very small set of cycles and picks each cycle that it generates without any further
considerations. The pure column generation based algorithm yields solution qualities
comparable to the Benders decomposition based algorithm with iterative cycle gen-
eration however it incurs a longer computational time and this difference increases
as the problem size increases. Though the number of cycles passed on to the integer
program in the pure column generation is not very high as compared to the number
of cycles at the end of Phase I in algorithm BI, the amount of time taken is much
higher. This can be contributed to the fact that as the problem size (number of


































































































































































































































































































































number of constraints increases in the column generation based algorithm. However,
in the Benders decomposition based algorithm the effect of increase in problem size
is distributed between the master problem and the subproblem.
Though the BI algorithm outperforms the BF algorithm uniformly, the difference
between the solution quality obtained by these algorithms is less than 6%. However,
the time taken in the BF algorithm is 4-5 times higher than the time taken by the BI
algorithm. This can be attributed to the fact that, in algorithm BF , many infeasible
cycles are generated by solving the circulation problem and decomposing its flow
in the first phase of the Benders decomposition based algorithm. For a 6(10) port
problem BF generated about 65%(60%) infeasible cycles in Phase I. Though more
cycles are submitted at the end of Phase I by algorithm BF , the branch-and-bound
takes far less time as compared to the corresponding branch-and-bound in algorithm
CI since most of the cycles generated by algorithm BF are infeasible for the integer
program and are removed at the start of the branch-and-bound. More over, in the
CI algorithm most of the time is spent in solving the LP relaxation via column
generation.
Table 6 reports results for test cases with up to 10 ports because the pure column
generation based algorithm and the flow decomposition based cycle generation algo-
rithm become computationally very expensive thus making CI and BF ineffective.
Also, the solution quality of the greedy algorithm decreases further as compared to
the Benders decomposition based algorithm. Table 6 establishes the superiority of
the solution, in terms of both CPU time and revenue generated, obtained by the two
phase Benders decomposition based algorithm with iterative cycle generation. Thus,
we used this algorithm to perform all further experiments.
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Table 2: Analysis of the Benders decomposition based algorithm.
Test Phase I Phase
Class iters sub-problem master cycle-gen II %gap
P6S18D6 13 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.01 10.24
P6S18D9 16 0.10 0.19 0.14 0.03 12.10
P6S30D6 20 0.06 0.23 0.17 0.03 2.30
P6S30D9 27 0.16 0.36 0.27 0.05 3.32
P10S30D18 47 7.24 6.13 5.17 1.99 8.55
P10S30D27 56 17.02 7.65 3.63 6.54 9.80
P10S50D18 75 23.87 20.64 16.09 19.65 1.91
P10S50D27 95 52.69 31.20 18.37 35.55 3.24
P15S45D42 130 105.86 69.46 52.27 35.25 8.63
P15S45D63 175 141.60 110.69 72.00 33.80 8.53
P15S75D42 181 172.25 152.49 118.80 167.72 5.30
P15S75D63 200 254.26 212.56 156.08 174.78 5.92
P20S60D76 200 1165.87 73.12 39.92 42.07 12.70
P20S60D114 200 1750.63 113.18 47.38 173.37 7.51
P20S100D76 200 2507.51 164.61 72.81 262.45 5.05
P20S100D114 200 3784.38 380.11 149.65 478.01 7.21
2.5.3 Analysis of the Benders Decomposition Based Algorithm
Our next set of experiments perform a deeper analysis of the Benders decomposition
based algorithm and are presented in Table 7. In these experiments we used initial
cuts and removed columns with large negative reduced costs after every 10 iterations
in the first phase of the Benders decomposition based algorithm. The second column
in Table 7 represents the number of iterations in the first phase of the algorithm. The
third, fourth and fifth columns present a breakdown of the total time taken in various
processes while solving the LPBMP . The next column represents the additional time
taken to obtain an integer solution. The last column reports the gap corresponding
to the relative difference between the upper bound, obtained by the CI algorithm,
and the integer solution value obtained by the BI algorithm. To keep computational
time under control, in Phase II, only 2-3 iterations of the Benders algorithm were
performed.
Table 7 suggests that as the number of demand triplets increase the time taken
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in solving the sub-problem increases. This is mainly because every demand triplet
is considered a different commodity thus as the number of demand triplets increase
the complexity of the multi-commodity flow problem or the subproblem increases (in
the number of variables and constraints) significantly. Note that an increase in the
number of demand triplets results in an increase in the time taken to solve the master
problem also. This is because of the increased possibilities with regard to the cycles
that can be generated. The overall time increases as we increase the number of ports,
the number of ships or the number of demand triplets.
For the same number of ports, as the number of ships increases the integrality gap
reduces significantly. This suggests that the set of cycles generated in the first phase
are good for the second phase also and given sufficient number of ships the gap can
be reduced further. For small test cases with 6 ports, we observed that the integer
solution obtained by our algorithm is indeed close to the optimal solution in many
cases and that LP based upper bound is not very tight. It is easily seen that the
integrality gap can be very bad. Consider a two port, one ship instance such that the
sailing time between ports is one week. An LP solution will assign half a ship to each
edge whereas an integer solution will yield zero revenue resulting in a 100% integrality
gap. However, given a sufficient number of ships such extremely pathological cases
are highly unlikely to occur.
Our next set of experiments studies the effect of using the refinements described
in Section 2.4.2 and Section 2.4.3. Using the two phase approach we solve each
instance first without the initial set of cuts, then without removing any column at
intermediate steps and finally by incorporating the initial cuts and removing columns
at intermediate steps to keep only a subset of columns. Parameters are chosen so that
the solution quality is not affected by these refinements however the computational
time is reduced significantly. Table 8 reports cycles generated, iterations performed
and the time taken for each of these cases. The total CPU time taken to find an
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Table 3: Effect of algorithmic refinements.
Test No Cuts + All Cols Cuts + All Cols Cuts + Remove Cols
Class #cycles iters time #cycles iters time #cycles iters time
P6S18D6 62 15 0.20 51 13 0.17 49 13 0.16
P6S18D9 93 15 0.34 87 15 0.33 64 16 0.30
P6S30D6 194 22 0.66 105 20 0.44 96 20 0.33
P6S30D9 240 30 1.03 131 27 0.88 120 27 0.57
P10S30D18 494 52 18.82 464 45 18.68 213 47 15.41
P10S30D27 673 60 64.50 603 55 50.45 292 56 30.56
P10S50D18 882 79 271.03 790 71 168.82 371 75 61.34
P10S50D27 1102 99 748.23 889 91 364.81 578 95 116.35
integer solution is also reported.
Table 8 reports results for networks with up to 10 ports because the time taken
in both phases of the Benders decomposition based algorithm becomes prohibitively
high, for networks with more than 10 ports, if we remove the initial cuts or do not
remove cycles with large negative reduced cost. Note that removing columns with
negative reduced cost less than -1,000,000 does not reduce the number of cycles sig-
nificantly for 6 port instances since not many cycles for such a small network have
a large negative reduced cost. However the same refinement reduces the number of
cycles for 10 port instances to approximately half the size suggesting that this refine-
ment must be tuned according to the problem size to properly control the number of
columns in the linear program.
Table 8 suggests that the CPU time as well as the number of iterations, in the
first phase of the Benders decomposition based algorithm, reduce by introducing the
initial cuts. However, a more significant reduction in time is achieved by removing
columns with large negative reduced cost. Removing very negative reduced cost cycles
does not affect the time taken in Phase I very much, but the number of columns that
the integer program works with in Phase II are reduced considerably and thus the
time taken in the second phase of the Benders decomposition based algorithm reduces
significantly.
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Finally, we study the effect of having only one ship type, in the fleet, on the
solution quality. Table 4 reports results for a fleet of identical ships with 4000 TEU
capacity. For each test class, we report the CPU time taken in Phase I and Phase II of
the Benders decomposition based algorithm with iterative search for cycle generation,
the total number of cycles generated and the optimality gap. In this case also, 2-3
iterations of the Benders algorithm were performed in Phase II.
Table 4: Effect of identical ships in the fleet.
Test Phase I Phase
Class sub-problem master cycle-gen II #cycles %gap
P6S18D6 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.00 35 1.43
P6S18D9 0.04 0.17 0.14 0.01 42 2.14
P6S30D6 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.00 60 0.16
P6S30D9 0.06 0.20 0.18 0.04 72 2.01
P10S30D18 3.92 2.97 2.41 0.30 190 2.25
P10S30D27 5.06 2.16 1.82 0.62 202 2.23
P10S50D18 8.32 6.98 5.25 2.02 243 1.45
P10S50D27 13.38 8.36 6.82 2.54 275 1.74
P15S45D42 51.72 17.40 15.35 3.72 398 2.53
P15S45D63 97.05 25.59 21.97 4.97 520 2.01
P15S75D42 171.12 52.77 37.77 5.20 583 1.93
P15S75D63 209.07 87.28 52.78 6.83 647 1.56
P20S60D76 1023.53 106.96 91.60 12.83 450 1.32
P20S60D114 1869.77 193.79 117.76 13.50 791 1.16
P20S100D76 1825.67 181.85 144.67 14.82 957 1.91
P20S100D114 2923.28 189.13 141.51 16.50 980 2.01
Table 4 suggests that if all the ships are identical the optimality gap reduces even
further in all the test classes. Since all ships are identical, in Phase II it becomes
easier to operate a service route using ships of similar kind to maintain the weekly
frequency. Comparing Table 7 to Table 4 suggests that the overall time taken also
reduces. The time taken in the cycle generation process reduces significantly as now
the cycle generation needs to be solved only for one ship type at every iteration. Thus
the time taken in the master problem decreases. Also note that a fewer number of
cycles are generated and thus the time taken in Phase II reduces significantly. As a
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result the overall solution time is reduced.
2.5.4 Analysis of the Solution
In this section, we take a closer look at the solution generated by the Benders de-
composition based algorithm and its implications. Also, we perform preliminary
experiments to study the effect of transshipment cost on cargo routing.
The second column in Table 5 reports the number of cycles or service routes picked
in the final solution. The number of service routes increases as the number of ships
and the number of ports increase. The next two columns in Table 5 report the average
percentage utilization of capacity on the edges of the network and the percentage of
the cargo that is transshipped. These results are for the case when we do not consider
transshipment cost i.e. the cost of transshipment is 0. Utilization of capacity on an
edge is calculated by dividing the total flow on that edge by the total capacity of the
edge. Recall that the capacity of an edge is defined by the number of ships (and their
capacities) that utilize the given edge. Across our problem instances, our algorithm
consistently reports high average percentage utilization, 70-90%, of capacity. Note
that higher the number of service routes, higher is the number of possibilities for cargo
routes. As a result the percentage of the cargo transshipped to the total cargo shipped
increases as the problem size increases. This trend is observed in our computational
study also as the amount of transshipped cargo increases from ∼ 19% for a 6 port
problem to ∼ 30% for a 10 port problem.
Next, we perform preliminary experiments to study the effect of transshipment
cost on cargo routing. Depending on the set of chosen service routes we construct a
new network. In the new network, at every port where two or more cycles meet a new
node is constructed for every cycle. The new nodes are connected to the original port
node via edges. These edges act as loading/unloading edges and have corresponding



















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: New network to study the effects of transshipments
the new network is given by Figure 7. At port p, cup and c
l
p denote the unloading
and loading cost respectively and the transshipment cost is given by cup + c
l
p. Thus
a transshipment occurs when at an intermediate port cargo travels on an unloading
and then a loading edge. In Figure 7, a cargo that is routed from port B to port D is
transshipped at port C and it uses the unloading edge from cycle C1 to port C and
the loading edge from port C to cycle C2.
To perform the experiment, we construct the new network for the cycles selected
at the end of the second phase of the Benders based algorithm. The cargo routing
problem is solved for both the, new and the original, networks. The effect of the trans-
shipment costs on the cargo routing decisions is studied by observing the percentage
difference between the demand satisfied in the original network (in the absence of
transshipment costs) and the new network (in the presence of transshipment costs).
Also we compute the percentage of cargo transshipped to the total cargo shipped.
These two statistics are reported in Table 5 for three different scenarios: transship-
ment cost = 20 units/per unit of cargo, transshipment cost = 100 units/per unit of
cargo and transshipment cost = 1000 units/per unit of cargo. Recall that the holding
cost at ports is chosen randomly from [1, 10] and the revenue generated by satisfying
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demand is chosen to be proportional to the distance (proportionality constant being
chosen randomly from [100, 200]) between the origin and destination ports. Note
that as the distance between ports is chosen from [2, 42] days, the revenue generated
is chosen from ∼ [200, 8000]. Thus the first scenario represents the case when the
transshipment cost is low and is comparable to the holding cost at a port. The third
scenario represents the case when the transshipment cost is very high and is compa-
rable to the revenue generated by satisfying demand. Such high transshipment costs
are highly unlikely however we discuss this scenario to present an extreme case.
Our computations yield that when the cost of transshipment is of the order of
the holding cost at a port or low as compared to the revenue generated by satisfying
demand, the routing decision in both networks are similar. However, as the transship-
ment cost increases the routing decisions change. Specifically, as the transshipment
cost increases from 20 to 1000 units the percentage change in the amount of demand
satisfied increases from 0% to ∼ 36%. We note that as the transshipments become
more and more expensive the percentage of the cargo transshipped to the total cargo
shipped decreases. An anomaly occurs in the first row last column of Table 5 as the
percentage of transshipped cargo increases from 12.84% to 15.17% when the trans-
shipment cost increases from 100 units to 1000 units. This occurs because as the
transshipment cost increases not only does the transshipments decrease but also the
demand that is satisfied decreases in many cases since the routing options get limited.
Thus for the last column the numerator as well as the denominator decreases. For
instances in the class P6S186 the denominator decreases faster than the numerator
because for this class of instances we have very few demand pairs (few things to route)
and on average very few selected cycles (very few alternative routing options).
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2.6 Concluding Remarks and Future Research
In this chapter we presented a new mathematical model for the simultaneous ship
scheduling and containerized cargo routing problem for liner shipping. The proposed
model captures the important weekly frequency constraint faced by the carriers and
allows them to take advantage of transshipping cargo. The structure of the model
makes it well suited for decomposition, leading to efficient algorithms. Effective ser-
vice routes for ships are generated selectively in a column generation setting using
an iterative search algorithm. Finally, the proposed solution approach is tested on
various test classes. Considering the preliminary results obtained, we believe that
the suggested solution approach has the potential to help the planners in developing
better routes for a fleet of up to 100 ships. The planners can also add their pre-
determined service routes to the model as a set of initial cycles and thus be a part
of the solution process to obtain a solution which is a “user’s solution” rather than
a “computer’s solution”. Our results indicate high percentage utilization of ships’
capacities and a significant number of transshipments in the final solution.
Our aim in this chapter is to provide a basic framework for simultaneous ship
scheduling and cargo routing. The model and the solution strategy presented here can
be enhanced in different ways. Next, we present some directions for future research.
The model presented in this chapter allows for transshipping the cargo from one
ship to another. At the end of Section 2.5.4 we presented an approach to account
for transshipment costs during cargo routing. However, the model does not take
in to account the transshipment costs while designing the service routes. Further
research is required to extend or modify the model to include transshipment costs.
This aspect is expected to increase the complexity of the model and the solution
procedures significantly.
In our model we allow only one ship type to maintain weekly frequency on a
service route. This provides same capacity in the network every week and is useful
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when a carrier faces same demand each week. However, it is possible that the de-
mand structure is not the same each week. Further research is required to allow for
multiple ship types on a service route. Changes in demand from week to week can be
incorporated easily by expanding the planning horizon, however incorporating cycles
with multiple ship types will require changes in the model and the cycle generation
scheme.
In the pure column generation algorithm and the Benders decomposition based
algorithm, no new columns are generated when solving the integer program. New
columns can be generated by solving the integer program in a branch-and-price (rather
than the branch and bound used here ) framework. Branch-and-price is expected to
improve the solution quality. However, there are many important and challenging
issues that are required to be resolved for developing a successful branch-and-price
algorithm. Specifically, a good branching rule needs to be devised. Standard branch-
ing on the cycle or the xC variables creates a problem along the branch where a
variable has been set to zero. xC = 0 means that cycle C needs to be excluded.
However, it is possible that the next time the pricing problem is solved to generate
a profitable cycle in this branch, the optimal solution is precisely the cycle C. Thus
the second best cycle must be considered. More over, at depth l in the branch and
price tree it might be necessary to construct the lth best cycle. Note that a successful
branch-and-price algorithm requires a pricing problem that can be solved very effi-
ciently, as it will be invoked many times. Explicitly excluding the specified cycles
from the pricing problem is computationally expensive. Even if a pool of cycles is
generated at every column generation step, one needs to keep track of all the cycles
that need to be excluded. Since commercial softwares such as CPLEX cannot handle
the branch and price framework, managing the search tree efficiently poses many im-
plementation challenges, such as deciding which nodes to branch on and which search
technique e.g. breadth first search, depth first search, best bound, etc to use.
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CHAPTER III
ALLIANCE FORMATION AMONG SEA CARRIERS
3.1 Introduction
In order to position themselves better against their competitors carriers rely on good
customer service (shorter transit times, higher frequency of service) and competitive
prices. However, some of the recent trends in the industry such as increasing cus-
tomer expectations, shrinking profit margins, new entrants (for example brand name
package delivery providers such as DHL and UPS that are synonymous with relia-
bility and speed) and new markets [45] are leading to cutthroat price competition
among various carriers. These market and customer pressures are driving carriers to
adopt solutions outside of their traditional business practices and identify competitors
with most synergies to increase profit margins and meet increasing customer expecta-
tions. Though carriers collaborate and form alliances on many trade routes they are
competitors with selfish interests. Sustainable collaborations require mechanisms to
govern membership rules and allocate costs and benefits in a fair way. As observed by
Jain and Vazirani [36] such problems appear in a wide variety of seemingly unrelated
fields such as internet routing, auctions, telecommunications and transportation and
have the following two properties in common:
1. In all of these problems a number of players/participants interact with varying
degree of collaboration and self motives.
2. The underlying computational problem is NP hard.
The mathematical tools and insights most appropriate to understand and analyze
these problems are obtained by uniting concepts of mathematical economics and game
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theory with that of algorithm design. The linear programming machinery, especially
ideas from duality theory such as primal dual methods, are heavily used in literature
to develop good algorithms for solving these problems [30], [36].
In this chapter and Chapter 5 we study strategic alliance formation among two
or more carriers in containerized liner shipping. Sea carriers collaborate to form
operational, pricing and logistical alliances. We study alliances, among sea carriers,
that are formed by pooling, exchanging and integrating ships in their fleet.
In this chapter, we first study the reasons that motivate carriers to collaborate
and form alliances. In Section 3.3, we review some relevant game theoretic concepts.
Carriers form alliances by pooling their ships and integrating their networks. The
maximum revenue that an alliance can generate can be obtained by replacing in-
dividual carriers with one large carrier, with a fleet equal to the combined fleet of
different individual carriers and a demand structure equal to the combined demand of
all carriers, and solving the corresponding optimization problem for a single carrier as
formulated in Chapter 2. In Section 3.4, we present a small example to study alliances
among liner carriers. In Section 3.5, for a special case of the problem, we provide
a fair allocation of the total revenue generated by the alliance among its members.
Allocation mechanisms for the general case are presented in Chapter 5.
3.2 Why Collaborate?
Traditionally, companies have focused on their own resources and ability to perform
effectively and efficiently. However, recently in logistics and supply chain manage-
ment, companies that in the past worked independently of each other, are working
in close liaison. The system wide collaboration perspective provides opportunities
for increased profitability that are impossible to achieve through internal focus only.
Vendor managed inventory (VMI) and shipper collaboration (for example the suc-
cess of collaborative logistics networks run by Nistevo and Transplace) are two of
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the most successful applications of collaboration in logistics to date. Globalization,
containerization, deregulation and easy integration of logistics networks of different
carriers due to technological advancements have led to similar trends in the sea cargo
industry.
Collaboration among sea carriers is not new. Carriers have used conferences, as
a means for curbing competition and controlling tariff rates in the market, for over
a century. The first conference was formed in 1875 on a route between the United
Kingdom and Calcutta, India. More recently, carriers are forming strategic alliances
that allow them to share capacity on a ship and to share slots at the ports. Since
1990, when Sea-Land and Maersk introduced the alliance system and began sharing
vessels in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, strategic alliances have become increas-
ingly common. The industry is becoming more and more consolidated (for example
Maersk’s bid for P&O Nedlloyd in 2005) and smaller alliances are collaborating to
form even bigger alliances (for example Grand Alliance and The New World Alliance
laid down foundation for cooperating in 2006). Figure 8 depicts some of the trends of
consolidation in 2007 as compared to those in 1995. More over, the shipping industry
in many nations including the United States has enjoyed anti-trust impunity because
of the widely accepted fact that this industry is highly capital intensive and collabo-
ration among carriers helps provide regular service between ports. According to [45],
in near future the top 10 carriers will control about 80% of the market with the next
20 carriers controlling about 15% of the market. We now list some of the motivating
factors for alliance formation among sea carriers. These have been studied by [67] in
detail.
1. In the last couple of decades, many factors have led to the consolidation of
manufacturing sector thus leading to bigger demands. This consolidation works
in favor of the shippers who can now control a bigger share of the market.
However this leads to squeezed profit margins for the sea cargo carriers. Sea
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Figure 8: Trend of consolidation
cargo carriers have counter acted by forming many alliances among themselves
to help them fix prices so that the shippers have less bargaining power.
2. Liner shipping is a capital intensive industry with infra-structural set up as its
backbone. Carriers need to invest heavily in assets such as ships (owning a ship
involves millions of US dollars and the cost of idling a 2,000 TEU ship is $20,000-
$25,000 per day), containers and land based facilities such as marine terminals
etc. Carriers collaborate and form alliances to reduce and share capital costs.
Huge costs are involved in maintenance and operation of ships as well. In
extreme cases of collaboration carriers form alliances with carriers who do not
own any ships or “NVO”s(Non-vessel operator). NVOs compensate ship owners
for using capacity on their ships and for ship owning carriers they act like
shippers with big demands. Similarly, a carrier who has invested heavily in
land based infra structure and marine terminals can improve the utilization of
these facilities by getting its partner’s cargo volume to assist in spreading the
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Figure 9: Increase in size of container ships. Source: Wikipedia
capital investment costs. Advent of containerization of cargo in 1990s demanded
new investments and many alliances at that time were formed to share this cost.
3. Ships are becoming larger and larger, as depicted by Figure 9, thus giving rise
to chronic over capacity. A recent increase in literature e.g. [35] on the viability
of larger ships is also a pointer towards the increasing use of bigger ships. The
construction cost, the cost of operation (e.g. fuel, equipment, port visit cost
e.t.c) and the cost of maintenance (e.g. crew cost, repair cost e.t.c.) on a
ship does not increase in proportion to the size of the ship. For example, in
1992 when ship size increased from 800 TEUs to 2,500 TEU’s (or 212%), the
construction cost increased by only 160%. This motivates construction of bigger
and bigger ships. However, the capacity on the ship is perishable. Once the
ship leaves the port the capacity becomes unusable until it reaches a loading
port again. Alliances provide carriers with opportunities to deploy bigger ships,
thus achieving reduction in cost via economies of scale and higher utilization
of space, by catering to the demand of multiple carriers. For example, two
carriers with 2,000 TEUs demand each week can deploy a single 4000 TEU ship
rather than two 2,000 TEUs ships and thus achieve economies of scale while
still satisfying their individual demands.
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4. Sea cargo industry is marked with low product differentiation. Almost all car-
riers have same facilities and ships with similar speeds. Containerization of
cargo further reduces any differences. The low differences help carriers to form
alliances easily.
5. Good frequency of service is essential for a carrier to achieve higher market
share. The “Just-in-time” inventory management system deployed by many
businesses demands timely and frequent transportation service. Thus, most
carriers have at least one departure each week from each port visited on a service
route. As observed in the previous chapter, this requires that the number of
ships that operate on a cycle be at least equal to the number of weeks that it
takes to complete a cycle. However some cycles such as the Asia- North America
cycle take up to eight weeks to complete. This means many ships are required
to maintain good frequency on these routes. However if two carriers with 2,000
TEU demand from Asia to North America run this eight week service route
in collaboration then each carrier would need to contribute only four ships
of 4000 TEUs and still have access to a weekly 2000 TEU capacity, with a
proportional allocation of space on the ships. This can also be viewed as a way
of breaking the discreteness of the ships. In this example we can say that a
carrier is running half a ship each week. Note that if a carriers has less than
eight ships then he cannot offer any service on this very profitable trade route.
More over, in the above example, if both carriers have eight ships each of 4000
TEU to offer for the service route then they can increase frequency on the route
and potentially grab a higher market share. For example according to 2005
data [47], the Grand Alliance, which is the largest integrated alliance, offers a
total capacity of 640,000 TEUs with 112 vessels dedicated to the three main
East-West trade lanes, thus maintaining its strong hold on these trade lanes by
offering faster transit times and high frequency service. Pooling ships together
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allows carriers to group ships with similar characteristics together, independent
of ownerships, to offer same services every week on jointly operated routes, by
deploying compatible ships on a service route.
6. Alliances help carriers to explore new markets and enhance their global reach.
Transshipments play a vital role in enhancing global markets. For example in
Figure 10 let carrier A and carrier B operate cycle C1 and C2 respectively. To
obtain benefit from an emerging market from port P1 to port P3 they can form
an alliance by offering space on their respective cycles and by transshipping
at port P2. Thus both of them have expanded markets without deploying any
additional ships. This is well suited for shippers as well as they can avoid dealing
with multiple carriers.
Alliances also help carriers redistribute their excess capacity and de-emphasize
or emphasize their operations in some areas. These needs often arise as a result
of change in corporate mission and internal decision regarding which trades to
participate in, exit, trim or expand. For example, in 2005 MISC, MOL, NYK,
OOCL and PIL started two collaborative routes to cover China, Singapore and
New Zealand. The strategic alliance allowed them to extend their services to
new destinations thus enhancing their role in those regions and generating new
opportunities for mutual growth. Similarly in 1993, Hapag Lloyd formed an
alliance with NOL and NYK, who offered Far East -North America service.
This alliance forced Hapag Lloyd to reduce its own weekly capacity on its trans
Atlantic route, to offer space to the alliance. However, this provided Hapag
Lloyd with an opportunity to access the trans Pacific trade and thus a chance
to redistribute its trans Atlantic capacity to the trans Pacific.
7. In spite of globalization, carriers tend to dominate their home markets and this
trend is expected to remain more or less the same. There are many reasons
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Figure 10: Transshipment at port P2
such as a better understanding of the political and geographical issues and
human instincts for this behavior. However this leads to huge imbalance in
trade in many cases. With an industry concerned with filling ships, alliances
help carriers to reduce the imbalance in trade and achieve better utilization of
ship’s capacity. For example two carriers, one with a high demand from North
America to Asia and another with a high demand from Asia to North America
can find perfect synergies for alliance formation.
Finally, we conclude that though the notion of cooperation runs contrary to the
concept of perfect competition, carriers form alliances to realize economies of scale,
extend customer base, increase asset utilization, regulate traffic and fix prices while
providing customers with more frequent sailings and faster transit times. Decisions
regarding the alliance routes have to be taken together by the alliance members.
However, it involves management costs etc and all partners have their own interests
in mind. Thus, to form successful alliances, carriers need to identify suitable partners
with most synergies. In many cases collaborators have parted ways because they
could not align their interests properly. For example, Ben Lines and P&O dissolved
their alliance because of their similar market focus in the east Europe trade. Though
alliances provide more opportunities to carriers, they make the network design com-
plicated and give rise to issues of distribution of benefits and costs. We consider these
issues next. But first we introduce some game theoretic definitions and concepts that
are relevant to this and the following chapters.
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3.3 Game Theory Basics
A cooperative game is defined by a set N of players and a characteristic function
opt : 2N → R. opt(S) maps a value to every subset/coalition S ⊂ N , interpreted
as the total gain the members of S can achieve by cooperating. We assume that
opt(∅) = 0. The set N itself is referred to as the grand coalition. The central
problem in cooperative game theory is how to allocate the total gain opt(N) among
the individual players i ∈ N in a “fair” way. We denote an allocation/payoff vector
by x = {x1, . . . , xn} ∈ R, where xi refers to the payoff made to player i.
One of the most prominent and widely accepted notions of fairness is the “core” of
the game. An allocation of benefits is said to be in the core if the sum of the payoffs
over all players is their maximum attainable profit (budget balance property) and no
subset of players can collude and obtain a better payoff for its members (stability
property). Mathematically, a payoff vector x is said to be in the core if:
∑
i∈N
xi = opt(N) (28)∑
i∈S
xi ≥ opt(S) ∀S ⊂ N. (29)
3.4 A First Look
As challenging as the optimization problem of network design for a set of carriers
is, it is also important to identify the rules governing the distribution of benefits
among the carriers. Assuming that a carrier is concerned only with a payoff at the
end and is indifferent towards which demand is satisfied and which service routes are
realized the sea cargo network design game can be defined as: Given a set of carriers
N = {1 · · ·n} and specific demand set Θk and Nak ships of type a for each carrier k,




Nak . Together they need to decide on a set of service routes for their
ships and select a set of cargo to be shipped on the chosen routes, to maximize the
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overall revenue generated by the alliance. Then they need to identify a “fair” payoff
method to allocate the revenue generated by the alliance among its members. Note
that in our study we ignore any costs, logistical and management, involved in forming
such alliances.
We refer to the participating carriers as players and any non empty subset of
N (including N itself and all the one element subsets) as a coalition. For a subset
S of carriers we denote by opt(S) the schedule obtained by solving the optimization
problem, as described in Chapter 2, when the demand and fleet size is restricted
to the carriers in the set S. By the characteristic function of the sea cargo network
design game we mean a real-valued function r(opt) defined on the subsets of N , which
assigns to each S ⊂ N the profit attainable by the schedule opt(S). In other words,
r(opt(S)) is the amount of payoff that the carriers in S can obtain, whatever the
remaining carriers may do. As observed in Chapter 2, determining opt(S) itself is a
hard problem. Also, we define a payoff allocation vector by x = {x1, ..., xn}, where
xk is the payoff allocated to carrier k.
A payoff allocation in the core represents a very strong type of stability (where
the grand alliance is not threatened by sub-coalitions) and provides a fair allocation
of benefits among the members. However, frequently the core of a game is empty.
Shapley [60] proved that if the characteristic function of a game is supermodular (i.e.
r(opt(S))+r(opt(T )) ≤ r(opt(S∪T ))+r(opt(S∩T ))) then the core is nonempty. We
now present a sea cargo network design game instance for which the characteristic
function is not supermodular.
Consider an instance with three ports with distances (in terms of the number of
weeks that a ship takes to reach from one port to another) as depicted in Figure 11.
Consider three carriers A with two ships and B and C with one ship each. Carrier
A has demand from port P2 to port P3 and carrier B and carrier C have demands
from port P1 to port P2. Assume all ships are identical with 1000 TEU capacity, all
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demands are unlimited, unit amount of revenue can be generated by satisfying a unit
of demand and there are no costs involved. Let us consider the set S = {A,B} and
T = {B,C}. Then, after maintaining a weekly frequency on operated cycles, clearly
r(opt(S)) = $2000: 3 ships on cycle P1 − P2 − P3 − P1.
r(opt(T )) = $1000: 2 ships on cycle P1 − P2 − P1.
r(opt(S ∪ T )) = $2000: 3 ships on cycle P1 − P2 − P3 − P1.
r(opt(S ∩ T )) = $0 : Carrier B cannot operate on its own.
Figure 11: The sea cargo network design game is not super-modular
Since in the above instance, r(opt(S∪T ))+ r(opt(S∩T ))  r(opt(S))+ r(opt(T ))
we do not have supermodularity. Also, in the above example it is easy to see that
r(opt({A})) = r(opt({B})) = r(opt({C})) = $0
r(opt({A,B})) = r(opt({A,C})) = $2000, r(opt({B,C})) = $1000
r(opt({A,B,C})) = $2000.
Thus for an allocation {xA, xB, xC} in the core, for the budget balance condition
we must have
xA + xB + xC = 2000 (30)
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and for the two carrier subset rationality constraints we must have
xA + xB ≥ 2000 (31)
xA + xC ≥ 2000 (32)
xB + xC ≥ 1000 (33)
⇒ xA + xB + xC ≥ 2500. (34)
Thus, the core in this example is empty. Next, we look at a subclass of the general
sea cargo network design game where an allocation in the core can always be found.
3.5 An Allocation in the Core
In this section we consider a subclass of the general sea cargo network design game,
namely the instances for which the the integer program (1) - (7) in Chapter 2 and
its linear programming relaxation have the same objective function value. For these
instances an allocation in the core can always be found with the help of the linear
programming machinery. We provide an algorithm, which utilizes the dual of the
problem, for obtaining an allocation in the core.
The use of dual variables for determining a payoff allocation in the core can be
traced back to the classic Bondareva-Shapley theorem [12] , [59]. It has been shown
that core allocation can be obtained as a function of dual variables for problems such
as the facility location game [30], in the special case when there is no integrality gap
for the corresponding linear programming relaxation, and for problems such as the
multicommodity flow game [42] in general.
Consider the LP relaxation of the integer linear program (1)-(7) from Chapter 2
where Θ = ∪kΘk and Na =
∑
k
Nak . As in Chapter 2, let π = {πv : πv ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ G},
λ = {λe : λe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ Ev}, ω = {ω(o,d,i) : ω(o,d,i) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ} and
σ = {σa : σa ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A} be the dual variables associated with constraints (2), (3),















tail(e) + λe ≥ −c
c










λe + LCσa ≥ −CostC ∀a ∈ A, ∀C (38)
π, σ, λ, ω ≥ 0. (39)
Let (π∗, λ∗, ω∗, σ∗) be an optimal solution to the above linear program.
Lemma 2. If there is no integrality gap for the LP relaxation of the sea cargo network












provides an allocation in the core.
Proof. We now prove that the allocation in (40) satisfies both conditions required for






























Figure 12: An allocation in the core may exist even when the LP relaxation has an
integrality gap
2. Stability
Let S ⊂ N . Since (π∗, λ∗, ω∗, σ∗) is an optimal solution to the dual of the linear
program for set N , it will be feasible for the dual of the corresponding program
for set S. (This is easy to see since constraints in (36) remain the same, the
right hand side for some edges in (37) reduces from R(o,d,i) − cce to −cce and
constraints in (38) either remain the same or drop out as the cycles become



















Theorem 2. The core of the sea cargo network design game is non-empty if the LP
relaxation has no integrality gap.
Since the payoff vector in (40) is in the core, this theorem easily follows. The
following example shows that the converse of the theorem does not hold in general.
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Consider an instance with three ports with distance (in terms of the number of
weeks that a ship takes to reach from one port to another) as depicted in Figure
12. Consider two carriers A and B with two ships each. Carrier A has 1000 TEUs
of demand from port P1 to P2 and 1000 TEUs of demand from port P1 to port
P3. Similarly, carrier B has 1000 TEUs of demand from port P3 to P2 and 1000
TEUs of demand from port P3 to port P1. Assume all ships are identical with 1000
TEU capacity, the revenue generated by satisfying a unit of demand depends on the
distance between ports (in direct proportion i.e. revenue generated by satisfying a
unit demand at port P1 from port P2 is 1 unit and the revenue generated by satisfying
a unit demand at port P1 from port P3 is
√
2 units) and there are no costs involved.
Clearly,
r(opt({A})) = $1000: 2 ships (1 each week) on cycle P1 − P2 − P1.
r(opt({B})) = $1000: 2 ships (1 each week) on cycle P3 − P2 − P3.
r(opt({A,B})) = $2
√
2 ∗ 1000: 3 ships (1 each week) on cycle P1 − P3 − P1.
LP relaxation r(opt({A,B})) = $2
√
2 ∗ 1000 + 0.5 ∗ 1000: 3 ships (1 each week) on
cycle P1 − P3 − P1 and 1 ship (0.5 each week) on either cycle P1 − P2 − P1 or cycle
P3 − P2 − P3.
In this example, even though there is an integrality gap (LP relaxation r(opt({A,B}))
- r(opt({A,B})) = 500), a payoff in the core exists (($
√




In this chapter we studied alliance formation among carriers. First, we presented the
motivation behind alliance formation. Carriers collaborate with each other to share
costs, extend customer base, provide better service frequency, achieve economies of
scale and to better utilize their assets. Then, we considered the distribution of the
overall revenue generated by an alliance among its members. For a special case of the
problem, when the LP relaxation of the problem has no integrality gap, we provided
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an allocation of the benefits that is in the core.
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CHAPTER IV
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR A MULTICOMMODITY
FLOW GAME IN SERVICE NETWORK ALLIANCES
4.1 Introduction
In the transportation industry carriers form alliances to design collaborative service
networks. They bring their assets, such as ships in sea cargo transportation, in to
a pool and operate them together to provide capacity on the edges of the network.
Further, carriers use this capacity to route their demand in the network. Collabo-
rative networks help carriers to improve asset utilization, share capital costs, gain
economies of scale and explore new markets. This situation where multiple partic-
ipants/players utilize the underlying collaborative network to simultaneously route
their revenue maximizing demand appears in other application areas as well. In the
case of the internet, the backbone infrastructure and network is provided by a set of
companies, and businesses and end users utilize the capacity on the network to route
their data by paying fees to the network owner(s). Similarly, in procurement net-
works where multiple commodities are sourced through common suppliers, allocating
capacity appropriately among the several commodities assumes great importance in
determining the profitability of the entire system [13].
In a centralized setting, for instance when there is a single decision-maker who
makes all the decisions, a maximum multi-commodity flow problem can be solved to
identify the set of demands to satisfy and to route the demand on the network. The
objective in this problem is to maximize the revenue by simultaneously shipping dif-
ferent commodities in such a way that the total amount of flow through each edge
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is no more than the edge’s capacity. However, in real life applications where multi-
ple players interact, although individual players form alliances to take advantage of
the synergies that exist among their operations, usually only part of the decisions
regarding the alliance’s operations are determined jointly. For example, given the
capacities in the underlying collaborative network, individual carriers selfishly make
their own routing decisions to satisfy their demand and maximize their own revenue.
Also, they collect the revenue generated by satisfying their own demand and exchange
capacity on the assets at some pre-determined prices. Specifically, a player does not
allow other players to freely utilize his capacity. In this chapter, we provide a mecha-
nism, an algorithmic solution adorned with side payments, to regulate the interaction
among the players by determining capacity exchange costs. These exchange prices
guide the individual players’ profit maximizing behavior towards the solution of the
centralized multicommodity flow problem. Furthermore, they lead to allocation of
the total revenue among the players with desirable properties.
Flow games were first considered by [37] and [38] for networks with a single com-
modity where each arc is owned by an unique player. [21] extended the results of
[38] by studying flow of multiple commodities on networks with a common source
and a sink for all commodities where each arc again assumed to be owned by an
unique player. More recently, [42] studies the coalitional multicommodity game in
which players are the nodes of the given network who own capacity in terms of the
maximum flow allowed through that node. In general, the focus of these papers is
to first obtain the optimal flow in the network by solving the centralized problem
using classical linear programming methods and then allocate the revenue among the
players in a “fair” way. To define fairness, most of the work in literature utilizes the
notion of the core allocation, the set of stable and budget balance allocations. [38]
and [42] utilize the dual solution to show that the core is non-empty for the particu-
lar flow games they consider. In general, [48] shows that for any linear programming
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game dual solution provides an allocation in the core.
The strategy of first computing a centralized solution to a game and then allocat-
ing the revenues obtained by this solution assumes a centralized planner in the sense
that, the individual players have no control on the system operations and at the end
they receive an overall payoff from the central planner. The centralized systems are
very efficient as the decision-maker chooses the optimal solution for the collaboration
and allocates the overall benefits in a fair manner so that the collaboration is stable.
However, in most settings designing fully centralized systems are not realistic. For
example, in carrier alliances the individual carriers will operate their own assets and
route their own demand incurring the relevant costs and revenues. Given that cen-
tralization is not always possible, in decentralized system the incentives within the
system must be designed in such a way that the individual players are motivated to
chose solutions that are collectively optimal for the collaboration and the revenue ob-
tained is close to the maximum revenue that can be obtained with a fully centralized
system. Decentralized shortest path problems have been studied from a mechanism
design point of view by for example [46] and [33]. They design second price auctions
or VCG type payment mechanisms to evaluate the cost of an edge in the network. A
well known problem with VCG auctions however is that the resulting prices may not
be in the core.
In this chapter, we consider a more general network as compared to the literature
in the sense that we allow multiple players to own capacity on a single edge. Our
model is further differentiated from the ones studied by [38] and [21] since we con-
sider multiple commodities with their respective sources and sinks. More over, the
contribution of this chapter is the design of a mechanism to distribute the benefits
of collaboration among the players in a decentralized setting of the multicommodity
flow game. As the players are selfish, an individual player follows a strategy which
maximizes his own revenue. We model this strategy explicitly as a linear program
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(LP ). The mechanism drives each individual player’s LP towards the collaborative
optimal solution using inverse optimization techniques. Specifically, the mechanism
computes capacity exchange costs on the edges of the network so that given these
costs the routing and capacity exchange decisions each player makes selfishly results
in the collaborative optimal flow. The mechanism allows a player to collect the rev-
enue from satisfying his own demand and charge (pay) other players for utilizing
capacity owned by him (them). We show that for the decentralized multicommodity
flow game, capacity exchange costs can always be found efficiently. Further, for a
special case of the problem, i.e. when each edge in the network has an unique owner,
we prove that the net revenue received by the players operating under the mechanism
provides an allocation in the core.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in the next section we review
some relevant game theoretic concepts. In Section 4.3 we present the formal problem
definition. In Section 4.4 we provide a basic core allocation. The design of the
mechanism and related results are discussed in Section 4.5. Our conclusions are
presented in Section 4.6.
4.2 Game Theory Basics
Two game theoretic concepts are relevant to this chapter - the notion of core and
mechanism design. The definition of core is provided in Chapter 3. We now define
mechanism design.
Given a set of players N and a set O of possible outcomes for these players, we let
vi(o) be the valuation of outcome o for player i. The goal of mechanism design is to
design an algorithm that chooses an outcome, õ ∈ O and an n-tuple of side payments
{s1, . . . , sn} such that the total payment, xi, to player i is xi = vi(õ) + si. The total
payment is what each individual player aims to optimize. Intuitively, a mechanism
design concerns both an algorithmic ingredient (to obtain the desirable solution) and
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a payment ingredient that motivates the players. This field has received widespread
attention recently and has been used successfully to develop algorithms and protocols
for inter-connected collection of computers such as on the internet. For a detailed
discussion of mechanism design we refer the reader to [46].
4.3 Problem Definition
We define the maximum multicommodity flow (MCF ) game as follows: let G =
(V,E) be a directed graph on a set of nodes V and a set of edges E. Let N be
the set of players. Each player i ∈ N has a demand set Di where d(o,d,i) denotes
the maximum amount of existing demand from node o to node d for player i and
r(o,d,i) denotes the revenue generated by delivering a unit of demand from o to d by
player i. Let ∪i∈NDi = D. Each edge e ∈ E has a capacity ce, which denotes the
maximum amount of flow, summed over all commodities, allowed on that edge. γie
denotes the fraction of capacity that player i owns on edge e and
∑
i∈N
γie = 1. In
the multicommodity setting, each demand triplet (o, d, i) is referred to as a different
commodity. An outcome of the game is a feasible multicommodity flow, subject
to demand and capacity constraints, that maximizes the overall revenue generated,
denoted by opt(N), and an allocation, x ∈ Rn, of the total revenue among the players.
For a set S ⊂ N , we denote by opt(S) the maximum revenue generated by the network
induced by players in set S.
Next, we present a linear program to compute the flow that maximizes the revenue
generated by the grand coalition. For ease of exposition, we introduce fictitious edges
(d, o, i), from node d to node o, for every commodity (o, d, i) such that the only flow
allowed on edge (d, o, i) is for commodity (o, d, i). For each (o, d, i), f
(o,d,i)
e denotes the
amount of flow of commodity (o, d, i) on edge e. The linear program can be written
as:












f (o,d,i)e ≤ 0 ∀v ∈ V ∀(o, d, i) ∈ D (42)∑
(o,d,i)∈D
f (o,d,i)e ≤ ce ∀e ∈ E (43)
f
(o,d,i)
(d,o,i) ≤ d(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ D (44)
f ≥ 0. (45)
In (PN), IEdges(v) denote the set of incoming edges into node v and OEdges(v)
denote the set of outgoing edges from node v. The objective function (41) maximizes
the revenue obtained by satisfying demand. Constraint (42) is a flow balance con-
straint at every node of the network. Note that if these inequalities hold for each
node v ∈ V then in fact they must hold with equality at every node. Constraint (43)
is a capacity constraint on each edge and constraint (44) is a demand constraint for
every commodity.
Let (DN) denote the dual of the linear program (PN). Let π = {π(o,d,i)v : π ≥
0, ∀v ∈ V, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ D}, α = {αe : αe ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E} and β = {β(o,d,i) : β(o,d,i) ≥
0, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ D} be the dual variables associated with constraints (42), (43) and (44)
respectively.
4.4 An Allocation in the Core
For cooperative games when the players are concerned with an overall payoff only,
utilizing the dual optimal solution to the grand coalition’s optimization problem is
a common strategy to obtain an allocation for the players. Such a payoff vector is
called a dual payoff vector and is obtained by assigning to each player an amount
which corresponds to the value of his resources, according to the dual solution. Also,
it is a well known result that for linear programming games, such as the one we
consider here, the dual payoff vectors provide an allocation in the core [48]. [38]
showed that for simple networks (single commodity flow networks where each edge
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has a single unit of capacity), every core allocation corresponds to an optimal dual
solution for the corresponding optimization problem. [56] proved a similar result for
a more general class of linear programming games.
Theorem 3. The core of the multicommodity flow game defined above is non-empty
and a payoff allocation in the core can be constructed in polynomial time by solving
the dual program (DN). However, the core of this game is not fully characterized by
these dual solutions.
Proof. This theorem can be easily proven by considering an optimal dual solution








Next, we provide an example to show that the core of the MCF game cannot be fully
characterized by the dual payoff vector (46). Consider a network with two nodes 1
and 2 and edge (1,2). Consider two players A and B such that player A owns 2 units
of capacity on edge (1,2) and player B has a unit demand from 1 to 2 generating a
unit revenue. Clearly, the optimal solution value is one unit and (xA = 0.5, xB = 0.5)
is an allocation in the core. However this payoff vector does not correspond to any
dual payoff vector (46) since every dual payoff vector will assign zero units to player
A.
4.5 Mechanism Design
In a MCF game, players collaborate by sharing capacity on the edges of the network.
Let the optimal collaborative flow in the network be f ∗, an optimal solution to (PN).
In many applications, given an optimal flow in the network, players are concerned
with not only their overall payoffs but also the flow decisions. For example when
carriers collaborate in transportation networks, each carrier collects the revenue from
his customers by satisfying their demand and evaluates the valuation of solution f ∗
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(d,o,i) . Note that it is in the best interest
of the collaboration that players make their demand routing and capacity exchange
decisions as implied by f ∗. However, the computation of optimal flow f ∗ ignores the
ownership of capacity on the edges by the players. That is, it assumes the players
readily exchange capacity on the edges of the network.
We now present a mechanism that provides incentives to the players to route their
flows and exchange capacity among themselves as prescribed by f ∗. The incentive is
provided in the form of capacity exchange costs, denoted by the vector cost. Capacity
exchange costs provide side payments, on top of the valuations vi(f ∗), to the players
to guide their selfish behaviors towards the optimal solution f ∗. That is, the net profit
generated by a player i is calculated by adding vi(f ∗) to the money player i receives
from the other players using capacities on his edges minus the money i pays to others
for using their capacities. We present a linear program, representing the perspective of
an individual player, that makes routing decisions for each player in order to maximize
the net profit for the player. Further, we utilize inverse optimization techniques and
calculate capacity exchange costs so that f ∗ becomes the optimal solution for all the
individual player’s LP ′s.
4.5.1 Single Player Problem
The key difficulties in modelling the individual player’s perspective in an alliance are
in determining: how should the player account for the flow of other players in the
network and what portion of their capacities can he use for routing his own flow.
We model the individual perspective of a player as a linear program. We assume
that if a player i owns γie fraction of capacity on edge e then he is allowed to collect
γie fraction of the cost payed by other players for using capacity on edge e. We
model an individual player’s perspective by assuming that he can route all the flow
in the network to maximize his profit. However in practice, an individual player
84
can only make decisions regarding his own flow. In this sense our approach is a
conservative one, since the maximum revenue that player i can obtain will always be
less than the optimal value of this model. However, as described later, this model
leads to allocations with desirable properties. In mathematical terms we represent





























f (o,d,i)e ≤ 0 ∀v ∈ V ∀(o, d, i) ∈ D (48)∑
(o,d,i)∈D
f (o,d,i)e ≤ ce ∀e ∈ E (49)
f
(o,d,i)
(d,o,i) ≤ d(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ D (50)
f ≥ 0. (51)
The objective function (47) consists of three terms. The first term maximizes the
revenue generated by satisfying demand. The second term computes the cost paid to
player i by other players for using capacity on an edge owned by player i. Similarly,
the third term represents the cost paid by player i to other players for using capacity
on their edges. Constraints (48)-(51) are network flow constraints.
4.5.2 Computation of Allocations Using Inverse Optimization
Our aim is to motivate player i so that the collaborative solution f ∗ is attractive to
him. To this end, we wish to identify a vector cost such that f ∗ is optimal for PSi.
The problem fits well in the inverse optimization framework where given a feasible
solution (flow vector f ∗) to the problem, we wish to identify the parameters of the
problem (cost vector cost) which will make the given solution (f ∗) optimal for the
problem. Inverse problems have been studied in a variety of fields such as portfolio
85
optimization [20] and traffic equilibrium [22]. [3] provides a unified framework for
studying many inverse optimization problems on networks such as the shortest path
problem, the assignment problem and the minimum cut problem.
Let (πi), (αi) and (βi) denote the dual variables associated with constraints (48),
(49) and (50) respectively and (DPSi) denote the dual program corresponding to
(PSi). Note that we use super-script i to denote that the dual is corresponding to
player i’s LP . One form of the linear programming optimality conditions states that
the primal solution f ∗ and a dual solution (πi, λi, ωi) are optimal for their respective
problems if f ∗ is feasible for (PSi) and (πi, λi, ωi) is feasible for (DPSi), and together
they satisfy the complementary slackness conditions. We say that a cost vector, cost,
is inverse feasible with respect to f ∗ if f ∗ is an optimal solution to (PSi) with cost
vector cost. Let E denote the set of edges that are utilized at full capacity in flow





e = ce}), D denote the set of demands that are
fully satisfied (that is, D = {(o, d, i) ∈ D : f ∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) = d(o,d,i)}), and F denote the set of
non zero flow vectors (that is, F = {f ∗(o,d,i)e : f ∗(o,d,i)e > 0}). Using the above notation
following gives us a characterization of the inverse feasible cost vector for player i:
(I i) : (πi)(o,d,i)v − (πi)(o,d,i)u + (αi)e ≥ −(1− γie)coste (o, d, i) ∈ Di e ∈ E : f ∗(o,d,i)e /∈ F(52)
(πi)(o,d,i)v − (πi)(o,d,i)u + (αi)e = −(1− γie)coste (o, d, i) ∈ Di e ∈ E : f ∗(o,d,i)e ∈ F(53)
(πi)(o,d,i)v − (πi)(o,d,i)u + (αi)e ≥ γiecoste (o, d, i) /∈ Di e ∈ E : f ∗(o,d,i)e /∈ F(54)

















i)(o,d,i) = 0 (o, d, i) /∈ Di : f ∗(o,d,i)(d,o,i) ∈ F(59)
(αi)e = 0 ∀e /∈ E (βi)(o,d,i) = 0 ∀(o, d, i) /∈ D(60)
(πi)(o,d,i)v ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ D ; (αi)e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E ; (βi)(o,d,i) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, i).(61)
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Thus the inverse problem for player i is to find a dual solution and a cost vector
that satisfies constraints (52) -(61). Constraints (52) - (55) are the dual feasibility
and complementary slackness conditions for the flow variables corresponding to each
demand triplet and each edge of the network. The first two constraints correspond
to the demand owned by player i and the next two constraints correspond to the
demand owned by the other players. Similarly, constraints (56) - (61) are the dual
feasibility and complementary slackness conditions for the flow variables correspond-
ing to demand triplets and the fictitious edges of the network. Constraints (56) -
(59) correspond to the demand owned by player i and the last two constraints are
for the demand owned by other players. Recall that our aim is to determine a cost
vector such that the flow f ∗, as given by the optimal solution to (PN), is optimal for
all single player problems (PSi). Extending the above arguments for all the players
gives us the following characterization of the inverse feasibility problem to determine
the vector cost
(INV P ) : ∪i∈N (I i). (62)
Thus the inverse problem INV P is the union of all the individual players’ inverse
problems connected together with the common cost vector.
To prohibit players from colluding to form sub coalitions, we require a cost vector
such that for any subset S ⊂ N of players f ∗ is an optimal solution for the corre-
sponding problem PSS. However, there are an exponential number of such subsets
and including the inverse problem corresponding to each of them in INV P will cause
INV P to become exponential in size. The next theorem shows that it is sufficient
to consider only individual players’ problems in INV P to determine a suitable cost
vector.
Theorem 4. The inverse problem (INV P ) identifies a cost vector such that f ∗ is







∗) denote a feasible solution to INV P .
Consider a subset S ⊂ N . Our claim is that for the inverse problem, IS, correspond-










is a feasible solution. That is, cost∗ is inverse feasi-













Consider a constraint similar to (52) for the inverse problem IS. Let (o, d, k) ∈





∗) is a feasible
solution for INV P we have:
(πk∗)(o,d,k)v − (πk∗)(o,d,k)u + (αk∗)e ≥ −(1− γke )cost∗e
(πi∗)(o,d,k)v − (πi∗)(o,d,k)u + (αi∗)e ≥ γiecost∗e i 6= k, i ∈ S.














If for demand (o, d, k) and edge e, f
∗(o,d,k)
e ∈ F then in INV P constraints corre-
sponding to f
∗(o,d,k)
e will be at equality and hence we will get equality in (63). Simi-
larly,
(
(πS∗), (αS∗), (βS∗), cost∗
)
satisfies other constraints in IS. Since our choice of
S was arbitrary this holds for every subset S ⊂ N . Thus it is enough to consider
only the inverse problems corresponding to individual players in INV P to determine
a cost vector that also prevents collusion among subsets of players.
To summarize, the inverse problem is a feasibility problem to identify the cost

























∀i ∈ N. (65)
The vector of payoffs (93) is such that
∑
i∈N
xi = opt(N). This is easy to see since
once a feasible solution is found for INV P , the flow in the network is same as the




si = 0. Next, we prove that the inverse problem INV P is feasible and thus
the mechanism can always be used to find a cost structure on the edges of the network.
Theorem 5. The inverse problem INV P is feasible.
Proof. For every inverse problem I i, let (yi)(o,d,k) ∀(o, d, k) ∈ D and (f i)(o,d,k)e ∀e ∈
E, ∀(o, d, k) ∈ D denote dual variables for constraints corresponding to (56)-(59) and
constraints (52)-(55) respectively. The dual for INV P can then be written as:














+ χ(v,o)(yi)(o,d,i) − χ(v,d)(yi)(o,d,i) ≤ 0 ∀v ∈ V, ∀(o, d) ∈ D, ∀i ∈ N
∑
(o,d,i)∈D













i)(o,d,i)e ≤ 0 ∀e ∈ E
(yi)(o,d,i) ≤ 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ D, ∀i ∈ N
(yi) ≥ 0, (f i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N.
χ(u,v) is an indicator function such that χ(u,v) = 1 if u = v and 0 otherwise. Clearly
the zero vector is a feasible solution to DINV P and the optimal objective value is
also zero (note that the last two constraints imply that (yi)(o,d,k) = 0 for all feasible
solutions of DINV P ). Since DINV P has a finite optimal value, from duality theory
we get that its dual INV P is feasible.
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4.5.3 Multicommodity Flow Game with a Unique Owner on Each Edge
In this section, we consider a special case of the multicommodity flow game in which
for every edge of the network, the capacity on the edge belongs to an unique player.
We denote by Ei the set of edges owned by player i. For this case, Theorem 6 states
that the payoff allocation (93) made by our mechanism is an allocation in the core.
Theorem 6. If each edge of the network has an unique owner, the payoff vector
x = {x1, . . . xn} where xi is given by (93) lies in the core of the multicommodity flow
game.
Proof. Recall that the payoff obtained by the mechanism is budget balance. Hence,
we only need to show the stability of payoff for every subset S ⊂ N . Consider a subset
S of players. The maximum revenue that the players in S can achieve on their own
is denoted by opt(S). It is obtained by considering a linear program (P S) (similar to
program (PN) in Section 4.3) on the network induced by the players in set S. Let us
denote the dual for linear program (P S) as











such that π(o,d,i)v − π(o,d,i)u + α(u,v) ≥ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ ∪i∈SEi , (o, d, i) ∈ ∪i∈SDi (67)
π(o,d,i)o − π
(o,d,i)
d + β(o,d,i) ≥ r(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ ∪i∈SD
i (68)
π(o,d,i)v ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ ∪i∈SDi ; αe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ ∪i∈SEi (69)
β(o,d,i) ≥ 0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ ∪i∈SDi. (70)
As proved in Theorem (4), (πS∗, αS∗, βS∗, cost∗) is a feasible solution for IS. We
will show that (πS∗, αS∗, βS∗) is a feasible solution for (DS). Since (πS∗, αS∗, βS∗) is




S∗)(o,d,i) ≥ r(o,d,i). (71)
This is easy to see by considering constraints corresponding to constraints (56) and
(57) in IS. Similarly, in the network induced by the players in S, for an edge
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e ∈ Ek, and (o, d, i) ∈ Di such that k, i ∈ S we have (by considering constraints
corresponding to constraints (52) and (53) in IS)








Since player k is the unique owner of edge e, γke = 1 and thus right hand side in (72)
is zero.
⇒ (πS∗)(o,d,i)u − (πS∗)(o,d,i)v + (αS∗)e ≥ 0. (73)













S∗)(o,d) ≥ opt(S). (74)























but left hand side in (75) is same as
∑
i∈S
xi from strong duality applied to (PSS) and





In this chapter we presented a mechanism that regulates the interactions among the
players in a multicommodity flow game. This scheme can be used in transportation
and communications systems when multiple businesses and organizations use a collab-
orative service network to deliver goods. The mechanism provides capacity exchange
costs on the edges of the network to motivate a player who owns the capacity on an
edge to sell it to a player who can utilize that capacity to satisfy his own demand.
Also the mechanism allows players to keep the revenue obtained by satisfying their
demand in a collaborative solution. In a special case, when each of the network edges
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is owned by an unique player we show that the allocation made by our mechanism
provides an allocation in the core.
We considered a particular behavioral model to capture the selfish perspective
of an individual player. Other behavioral models have also been considered in [2]
and [34]. Different behavioral models lead to different capacity exchange prices with
different properties. For further details on comparison of different behavioral models
we refer the reader to [2]. Whether the payoff given by (93) provides an allocation
in the core or not in the general case, that is when the edges have multiple owners,
remains an open question.
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CHAPTER V
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR LINER SHIPPING
ALLIANCES
5.1 Introduction
The discussion in Chapter 3 on payoffs among carriers in an alliance guarantees a
stable allocation only for a subclass of the sea cargo network design game (when
the integer program (1) - (7) in Chapter 2 and its linear programming relaxation
have the same objective function value). Also, it works on the assumption that the
carriers are indifferent towards which demands are satisfied and which routes are
scheduled. However, this is usually not the case in practice. A carrier spends his
resources on maintaining and operating his ships and benefits from satisfying his own
demand. In this chapter we develop a mechanism that utilizes ideas from game theory,
economics and inverse optimization to allocate benefits and costs among carriers. In
literature a wide variety of problems ranging from auctions, voting, internet routing,
transportation and traffic routing, facility location [30], [54] e.t.c. have been studied
in a distributed setting. The general problem studied involves interaction among
self-interested players with their own goals and preferences, and the capability of
manipulating the system. The goal is to develop algorithms and protocols, for a
set of players, that perform well when the players behave selfishly. The notion from
game theory most relevant to this chapter is that of “mechanism design” (introduced
formally in Chapter 4).
In general, the field of mechanism design aims to study how privately known
preferences of many people can be aggregated towards a “social choice”. Intutively,
a mechanism solves a given problem by providing side payments to players to assure
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that the required output occurs, when players choose their strategies so as to maximize
their own selfish profits. This field has received widespread attention recently and
has been used successfully to develop algorithms and protocols for inter-connected
collection of computers such as on the internet. In the general setting of mechanism
design problems the utility or the valuation of an outcome for a player is private
information of the player and the goal is to design mechanisms to promote truthful
reporting of the utility among players. Most often the mechanism design theory
ignores the computational aspect of the protocol and emphasizes on theoretical results
that might be computationally challenging to achieve. For a detailed discussion of
mechanism design we refer the reader to [46].
In this chapter, the focus is to design computationally efficient mechanisms to
distribute “benefits” and “costs” among different sea carriers in a liner shipping al-
liance and motivate them to act in an optimal fashion. In literature a few references
are available regarding qualitative study of liner shipping alliances, however a quan-
titative study is missing. In this chapter we provide a mathematical framework to
study these alliances. Carriers form strategic alliances by pooling their fleets and
operating them together to share capacity on the ships. In such alliances, the carriers
decide on a set of service routes, assign their ships for operating the chosen routes
and allocate each ship’s capacity among the alliance members. As a result of these
alliances and agreements, shipments arranged through one carrier may actually be
moved by a ship operated by another carrier and alliance members can offer higher
sailing frequencies than would be possible using only their own ships. Alliances are
most common on deep sea routes such as the Asia-North America route that require
a bigger commitment in terms of assets (ships) from carriers. In the mid 1990s an
estimated 60% of the total global liner capacity was accounted by alliances.
From the perspective of a single carrier, each carrier would like to design a service
network which maximizes his profit. However, since he is working in collaboration
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with other carriers, a network that generates maximum overall revenue for all carriers
is selected. Clearly, such a network can be generated by replacing the individual
carriers by a large carrier, with demand equal to the consolidated demand of all
carriers and fleet equal to the pooled fleet of all carriers, and obtaining a schedule
(or outcome say õ) by solving the optimization problem presented in Chapter 2 for
the large carrier. We refer to this solution as the collaborative optimal solution. Each
carrier has a valuation of the collaborative optimal solution for himself, depending
on the cost incurred by him and the revenue generated by shipping his demand on
the collaborative routes. Let us denote the valuation of schedule õ for carrier k by
vk(õ). vk(õ) alone is not guaranteed to provide enough motivation for carrier k to
act according to the schedule, õ. The goal in this chapter is to obtain an n-tuple of
side payments {s1, · · · , sn} such that for every carrier k the total payoff to carrier
k, xk = vk(õ) + sk, motivates him to act in accordance with the optimal schedule õ.
In the collaborative optimal solution often the “resource,” e.g. capacity on a ship,
belongs to some carrier who does not allow other carriers to freely obtain “benefits”
from using it. The fair distribution of costs and benefits among the alliance members
is an intriguing question and in transportation networks, in particular liner shipping,
sharing benefits and costs among the carriers generally translates into exchanging
asset capacity on service routes. One way to regulate capacity exchanges among
the carriers is to assign suitable capacity exchange costs so that the carrier who has
unused capacity on a ship is motivated to sell the capacity to a carrier who can utilize
it to deliver cargo. We utilize capacity exchange costs to provide side payments to
the carriers. These payments are made by the carriers who utilize a ship’s capacity,
depending on the amount of utilization, to the carrier who owns the ship. To compute
these costs we model the individual behavior of a carrier in the alliance as a linear
program. The mechanism drives each individual carrier’s linear program towards the
collaborative optimal solution õ using inverse programming techniques.
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In the next section we present a brief literature review and in Section 5.3 we present
the formal problem definition. In Section 5.4 we present our solution strategy and
an inverse optimization based mechanism to compute side payments for the carriers.
In Section 5.5 we compare the fairness of the payoff to a carrier obtained by our
algorithm against the core allocation. As described formally in Chapter 3, allocations
in the core are budget balance and stable. Finally, in Section 5.6 we present future
directions for our research.
5.2 Literature Review
There exists literature that joins cooperative game theory with classical routing prob-
lems. [57] develops an allocation mechanism for a transportation game. [32] and [31]
study delivery games associated with the Chinese postman problem. [41] and [26]
study the vehicle routing game with homogeneous and heterogeneous fleet respec-
tively and allocate cost among the members of an alliance based on cooperative game
theory concepts. Network related games such as the network design games [39], the
assignment game [61] and the facility location games [30] have also been studied in
the literature. Some studies on combinatorial games such as the bin packing games
[25] and the knapsack game [25] are also available.
In particular, qualitative studies regarding alliance formation among carriers in
liner shipping industry are available in the literature. [44], [63], [55], [64] discuss
the importance of strategic alliances in liner shipping. In particular, [44] studies the
factors that led to the advent of strategic alliances among liner carriers 30 years ago,
and the changes in the industry in the 1990s (for example, the increase in demand
due to globalization) that made the previous alliances inadequate and called for a
new generation of strategic partnerships. It suggests that differentiation in the con-
tribution of each member, depending on their core competencies, can lead to alliances
that deliver more than the sum of individual contributions. Also, alliances with fewer
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members or ones that are led by a dominant partner are more likely to succeed. [63]
provides industry data to support the claim that alliances lead to intensification in
service frequency and an increase in ship size. It points out that as a result of al-
liances, carriers are becoming more similar (with similar service routes, serving the
same markets and employing comparable ships) and although individual carriers who
form alliances serve more ports than before, the total number of ports served by the
overall industry remain remarkably constant. [55] studies the progression of collabo-
rations from consortia, which are route-based forms of cooperation, to alliances, which
cooperate on a global level, among Asian carriers. They argue that the reasons behind
this trend are the flexibilities and synergies provided by alliances in global perspec-
tive. [64] makes use of cooperative game theory and provides a quantitative study to
analyze liner shipping alliances by considering two small examples (3 ports and 2-3
carriers). They explicitly write all the core inequalities to analyze the alliance and
allocate the revenue among the members in ratio of their shipping capacity. However,
as we will see later, in many situations such a proportional allocation of benefits is
not guaranteed to provide a payoff to the alliance members to sustain the existence of
the collaboration. Also, [64] does not provide any framework for dealing with larger
instances for which it becomes harder to explicitly write all the core inequalities.
5.3 Problem Definition
In this section we formally present our problem. Our attempt is to use as much as
possible the standard notions from both mechanism design and inverse optimization.
We will use the notation introduced in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 to refer to the set,
N = {1, 2 · · ·n}, of carriers and their fleet size and demand triplets. To simplify our
study we assume that all ships are identical. Thus for a carrier k ∈ N , Θk represents
his demand set and Nk represents the number of ships in his fleet.
The liner shipping mechanism design problem is defined as follows. We are given
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a set of carriers N who wish to form an alliance by consolidating their demand
Θ = ∪kΘk, and pooling their ships, N =
∑
k
Nk. Following are the set of problems
that the carriers face:
1. Together they need to design their service network. For this, they need to design
a set of service routes (say C = {C1, · · · , Cr}) to operate, utilizing their ships.
Also, they need to decide a set of cargo (say Θ ⊂ Θ) to deliver and the paths
to use to deliver the selected cargo.
2. The members of the alliance need to decide how to realize the service routes
in C. For example, they need to decide the number of ships that each carrier
should assign to the service routes in C.
3. Each carrier k needs to compute the valuation, vk, of the solution, given by
(C, Θ), depending on the cost incurred by him and the revenue generated by
delivering his demands.
4. For a given (C, Θ), the valuation vk alone is not enough to guarantee that carrier
k will route his cargo and share capacity as determined by the collaborative
solution. Thus the alliance needs to put in place a mechanism that provides
the right incentives to the carriers in order for them to act as prescribed by
the collaborative solution. We provide incentives in the form of side payments
{s1, · · · , sn}, such that the total payment, xk = vk + sk, to carrier k motivates
him to participate in the alliance. Furthermore, the side payments are the net
sum of the capacity exchange costs a carrier pays to and receives from other
carriers.
5.4 Solution Strategy
In this section, we propose a set of algorithms for resolving the above problems faced
by the alliance members. Before providing the details, we first present an outline of
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our solution strategy. The goal of an individual carrier is to design a service network
which maximizes his profit. However, since he is working in collaboration with other
carriers, a network that generates maximum overall revenue for all the carriers is
selected. Clearly, such a network can be obtained by replacing the individual carriers’
fleet by N , the combined fleet of all the carriers, and the individual demand sets by Θ,
the combined demand of all the carriers, and then solving a network design problem
as presented in Chapter 2 on this input. We use the solution strategy described
in Chapter 2 to solve this optimization problem and obtain a collaborative optimal
solution opt(N ) = (C,Θ).
It is non-trivial for the alliance to realize the solution given by the optimization
algorithm. In a carrier alliance such as the one addressed here, it is not reasonable
to assume that there exists a fully centralized body that can operate the combined
fleet, make the overall cargo accept-reject and routing decisions and hence gather the
total profit and then allocate it among the members of the alliance in a fair manner.
A more realistic model of operation is to assume that once the collaborative optimal
service routes and the ships to operate on them are decided centrally, then the carriers
individually operate their ships incurring the operational costs and make their own
cargo accept-reject and routing decisions determining the revenue they earn. In such
a partial decentralized system the challenges are (i) to design a mechanism that
regulates the interactions among the carriers, that is exchange of capacity on each
others’ ships; and (ii) to provide incentives so that the carriers’ individual accept-
reject and routing decisions are as prescribed by the collaborative optimal solution.
One straight forward way to handle the exchange of capacity among the carriers
is to use a proportional space allocation algorithm assigning each carrier a capacity
on a network edge in proportion to the capacity provided by the carrier to that edge.
However, such a simple allocation algorithm does not guarantee to provide outcomes
that can achieve the generation of the maximum possible profit, opt(N ). To see this
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consider a simple network with two ports P1 and P2 such that it takes a ship one week
to reach from one port to the other. Now let two carriers A and B with one ship
each of 1000 TEU capacity form an alliance to operate a service route with weekly
frequency between the two ports. Let A have 700 TEUs of demand and B have 300
TEUs of weekly demand from P1 to P2. Assume that a unit amount of revenue can
be generated by satisfying any demand and that ship operation costs are negligible.
Then a proportional space allocation algorithm would assign a capacity of 500 TEUs
to each carrier and would be able to generate only 800 units of weekly revenue whereas
the optimal solution to the problem is 1000 units of weekly revenue.
The valuation of solution opt(N ) is calculated for each carrier by calculating the
revenue generated by him and the costs incurred by him. The valuation obtained
from solution opt(N ) however is not guaranteed to provide enough motivation for a
carrier to act according to the schedule opt(N ). To provide this guarantee incentives
in the form of side payments must be provided to the carriers.
To handle both of the challenges described above, we suggest that the centralized
authority also determines capacity exchange costs on each edge of the service network
and then lets the carriers make cargo accept-reject and routing decisions, buying and
selling capacity along the way at the given prices. That is, we determine side payment
as the net sum of the capacity exchange costs a carrier receives from others for utilizing
capacity on his ships and pays to others for utilizing their capacity.
Computation of capacity exchange costs is however non-trivial. In Section 5.4.1
we show that the assignment of different carriers’ ships to various selected cycles
reduces to a generalized assignment problem in our setting. For a carrier, given an
assignment of his ships to the cycles in C, the computation of the fraction of capacity
that the carrier owns on an edge is explained in Section 5.4.2. We denote by coste
the cost of using one TEU capacity on edge e. In other words, if a carrier provides
capacity on an edge e then for a unit utilization of capacity on edge e he will charge
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other carriers coste times the fraction of the capacity he owns on edge e. Note that
the optimal solution opt(N ) provides a flow vector f on the edges of the network. We
provide a linear program that models the behavior of each carrier k for making cargo
accept-reject and routing decisions, equivalently determining his optimal flow vector
fk. Finally, we use inverse optimization techniques to determine the cost vector,
coste, such that the optimal flow vector fk for each carrier k is as prescribed by the
collaborative optimal flow vector f . That is, the vector of side payments determined
by the capacity exchange costs makes the solution opt(N ) attractive to all the carriers.
We now provide the details of our solution strategy.
5.4.1 Valuation of the Schedule
For a carrier, the valuation of solution opt(N ) is determined by calculating the revenue
generated by him and the costs incurred by him. The revenue generated by carrier k is
calculated by summing over the revenue generated by satisfying demand (o, d, i) such
that (o, d, i) ∈ Θ∩Θk. Similarly, each carrier pays for maintaining and operating his
ships on the collaborative routes. To compute the costs incurred, a carrier first needs
to know the assignment of his ships to the selected routes. Recall that as explained in
Chapter 2, LC denotes the number of ships required to maintain a weekly frequency
on cycle C and that the cycle selection variables in the mixed integer linear program
in (1) -(7) are binary i.e. the maximum frequency maintained on a cycle is a weekly
frequency. Let, ykCj represents the number of ships carrier k assigns to route Cj and
ukCj represents the utility he obtains by assigning one ship to route Cj. The problem
of assigning ships, for all the carriers, to the set of selected service routes reduces to
a generalized assignment problem which we refer to as the ship assignment problem
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(SAP ).










ykCj = LCj ∀Cj ∈ C (77)∑
Cj
ykCj ≤ N
k ∀k ∈ N (78)
ykCj int. (79)
The generalized assignment problem is shown to be NP-hard. It is a well studied
problem in literature and many heuristics have been proposed to solve it effectively
[58]. The utility function, u, can be determined heuristically in many different ways.
We compute the utility function in two different ways - first, we take the utility of
assigning a ship to a service route for a carrier to be proportional to the flow of carrier
on that service route and second, we take it to be proportional to the profit generated
by the carrier from that service route. We solve the ship assignment problem exactly
and heuristically. In Section 5.5.1 we report the effect of different ship assignment
algorithms and different utility functions on the overall mechanism.
Once an assignment of ships to service routes is computed, the cost incurred by
carrier k in the alliance is computed as






Note that cost of operating a ship on cycle Cj (or the cost of cycle Cj per week) is
given by CostCj . Thus if carrier k assigns y
k
Cj
ships to cycle Cj then the cost per week
incurred by him on this cycle is
CostCj
LCj
ykCj . Finally, the valuation of solution opt(N)




R(o,d,i)f − Cost of operating routes. (80)
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5.4.2 Computation of Side Payments
In an alliance, carriers work in collaboration with each other, however the primary
objective of an individual carrier remains to be the maximization of his own profits.
We model the selfish behavior of carriers by assuming that given the collaborative
network the carriers solve their cargo routing problems individually. Given an assign-
ment of ships, it is in the best interest of the collaboration that the carriers make
their cargo routing decisions as in f̄ . Note that f̄ requires carriers to share capacity
on the ships. We facilitate this by allowing a carrier to charge other carriers for using
capacity on the edges of the network. For this we need to determine when can a
carrier charge other carriers for using capacity on an edge and at what price. Next,
we answer these two questions.
We allow a carrier to charge other carriers for using capacity on a network edge
e whenever he owns the capacity on that edge i.e. whenever he has a ship assigned
to e. The rest of the times he will need to pay other carriers for using capacity on
edge e. As carriers pool their ships in an alliance to operate on service routes, usually
multiple carriers have their ships assigned to any given edge. In other words, carriers
usually own a fraction of the capacity on an edge. Given an assignment of ships of
various carriers to the routes in C, let γke be the fraction of capacity that carrier k
owns on edge e. Recall that we assume all ships are identical with T units of capacity.
Thus, in the special case, when an edge e is part of a single service route Cj and the








However, an edge can be part of many operated service routes. Next, we compute
γke for this case. Consider an edge e that is part of multiple service routes, C̃ =
{C1, C2, · · · , Cr} ⊂ C. The total capacity that carrier k owns on edge e due to his





. As e is part of r cycles and thus total
103



































Once we have determined the fraction of capacity each carrier owns on an edge,
the problem of determining suitable prices on the network edges reduces to the multi-
commodity flow game discussed in Chapter 4. As denoted earlier, we refer to these
prices as the capacity exchange costs and on an edge e we denote it by coste. The
capacity exchange costs provide side payments to the players, in addition to the
valuation (80) obtained by them. Note that the capacity on the edges in the network
is given by the collaborative optimal solution opt(N ), since carriers operate same
service routes as in opt(N ). On an edge e, we denote this capacity by Cape. Let
fk = {f (o,d,i),ke : f (o,d,i),ke ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ}, where f (o,d,i),ke represents the
optimal flow of demand (o, d, i) on edge e when carrier k makes his cargo accept-reject
and routing decisions. Similar to Chapter 4 we propose the following mathematical



























f (o,d,i),ke ≤ 0 ∀v ∈ V, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ(82)∑
(o,d,i)∈Θ




(o,d,i) ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ(84)
f (o,d,i),ke ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ.(85)
The objective function (81) consists of three terms. The first term denotes the
revenue generated by satisfying demand corresponding to player k. The second term
computes the cost paid to player k by the other players for using capacity owned by
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him. Similarly, the third term represents the cost paid by player k to the other players
in the alliance for using their capacity. Constraints (82)- (85) are the network flow
constraints. Note that this is a conservative model since we allow an individual player
to modify other player’s flow also. In practice, an individual can only make decisions
regarding his own flow. Thus the maximum revenue that player k can obtain will
always be less than the optimal value of (SCP k).
Assignment of Prices to Network Edges For the single carrier problem (SCP k)
we wish to identify a cost vector, cost, such that the collaborative optimal flow,
f , is an optimal decision for the carrier also. This problem fits well in the inverse
optimization framework where given a feasible solution (flow vector f) to a linear
program (SCP k), we wish to identify the parameters of the problem (cost vector
cost) which will make the given solution (flow vector f) optimal for the problem
(SCP k). Next, we demonstrate the use of inverse optimization (as in Chapter 4) to
compute the cost vector coste.
As in previous chapters, we denote by πk = {π(o,d,i),kv : π(o,d,i),kv ≥ 0 ∀v ∈
V, ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ} , λk = {λke : λke ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ Ev} and ωk = {ω(o,d,i),k : ω(o,d,i),k ≥
0 ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θ} the dual variables associated with constraints (82), (83) and (84)
respectively. Note the use of super-script k to denote that the dual is considered for
the single carrier problem corresponding to carrier k. For carrier k, the dual of the






































(o,d,i),k ≥ R(o,d,i) ∀e ∈ Ef , ∀(o, d, i) ∈ Θk (90)
πk, λk, ωk ≥ 0. (91)
One form of the linear programming optimality conditions states that the primal
solution fk and dual solution (πk, λk, ωk) are optimal for their respective problems if
fk is feasible for the linear program in (82) - (85) and (πk, λk, ωk) is feasible for the
linear program in (87) - (91), and together they satisfy the following complementary
slackness conditions:





e < Cape, λ
k
e = 0
for all carriers k.







D(o,d,i), ω(o,d,i),k = 0 for all carriers k.
• For all edges e with non zero flow, i.e. fke > 0, the corresponding dual constraints
in (87) -(91) are satisfied at equality.
We say that a cost vector cost is inverse feasible with respect to fk if fk is an
optimal solution to SCP k with cost vector cost. Let us denote by INV P k the inverse
problem that finds this cost vector. Note that INV P k is similar to the inverse problem
Ik in Chapter 4.
Our aim is to determine the cost vector such that the flow f as given by opt(N )
is optimal for all individual carrier problems i.e. SCP k ∀k ∈ N . From above, f is




, ωk) and a common cost vector cost that satisfies the primal-dual
complementary slackness conditions. This gives us the following characterization of
the inverse optimization problem we should solve to determine the vector cost:
(INV P ) : ∪i∈N INV P k (92)
In other words, the inverse problem is a feasibility problem to identify the cost
vector. If cost is a feasible solution to (INV P ), the overall payoff to player k is given
by:
xk = vk(opt(N )) + sk (93)











(1− γke )f (o,d,i)e
)
coste. (94)




r(opt(N )). This is easy to see since once a feasible solution is found for (INV P ), the
flow in the network is the same as the flow of the optimal solution opt(N ). Also note
that the vector of side payments {s1, s2, · · · , sn} is such that
∑
k∈N
sk = 0. Similar to
Theorem 5 in Chapter 4, Theorem 7 guarantees that the inverse problem is feasible
and a cost vector can always be found.
Theorem 7. The inverse problem (INV P ) is feasible.
To prohibit the players from colluding to form sub-coalitions, we want to have a
cost vector such that for any subset S ⊂ N , f is an optimal solution for the corre-
sponding problem (SCP S). However, there are exponential number of such subsets
and including an inverse problem corresponding to each of them in (INV P ) will cause
(INV P ) to become exponential in size. Theorem 4 from Chapter 4 guarantees that
it is sufficient to consider only single carrier problems in (INV P ) to determine a cost
vector that makes f optimal for any subset S ⊂ N of carriers.
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It is reasonable to assume that an individual carrier would seek higher payoff in
the alliance as compared to the revenue that he can generate on his own. To this end,
we have enhanced our model by adding the following set of limited (single carrier and
two carrier subset) rationality constraints in (INV P ):
opt({k}) ≥ xk for each k ∈ N . (95)
opt({k, i}) ≥ xk + xi for k, i ∈ N . (96)
where, opt(S) for S ⊂ N is the maximum revenue that the carriers in set S can
obtain, when working on their own.
5.5 Computational Experiments
Next, we analyze liner shipping alliances from a quantitative as well as qualitative
point of view. The focus of our computations is to study the performance of the
mechanism designed in this chapter in the context of liner shipping.
We performed our computations on instances involving up to 10 ports with up
to 27 demand triplets and 50 ships. The data is generated as explained earlier in
Chapter 2 and the same notation is used to express various problem classes. All of
our algorithms are implemented in C++ in an Unix environment. We also made
extensive use of the callable libraries in CPLEX 9.0. All computational experiments
were performed on a Sun280R system with UltraSparc-III processor. Results are
reported on 50 randomly generated instances in each test class.
We measure the performance of the mechanism by checking if the payoffs obtained
in (93) are in the core. As explained in Chapter 3, an allocation of benefits is in the
core if it is budget balance and stable. Note that the core provides a very strong
definition of stability where the grand alliance is not threatened by any of the sub-
coalitions. However, as demonstrated by the example in Section 3.4 (Chapter 3), the
core of the network design game in liner shipping can be empty.
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5.5.1 Effect of Ship Assignment and Rationality Constraints
Recall that the problem of assigning ships of different carriers on the service routes
is formulated as (SAP ) in Section 5.4.1. As noted earlier, this problem is NP-hard.
However, in our case since the number of selected service routes are between 3 and
10 (depending on the problem size), an explicit enumeration scheme can also be used
to determine the exact assignment of ships to the service routes. Next, we study
how the mechanism is effected by different assignment of ships on the service routes.
We obtain different assignment by considering different algorithms to solve (SAP ).
In particular, we consider an exact assignment, a greedy assignment and a random
assignment of the ships. We also consider two different utility functions (u in the
objective function of (SAP )) - 1. the utility of assigning a ship to a service route for
a carrier is taken proportional to the sum of his flow on the edges of the service route
(denoted by f) and 2. the utility of assigning a ship to a service route for a carrier is
taken to be proportional to the sum of his profit generated from his flow on the edges
of the service route (denoted by f.R).
We also study the effect of enhancing the inverse problem (INV P ) by adding ra-
tionality constraints. As mentioned at the end of Section 5.4.2, rationality constraint
for a subset S of carriers states that carriers in S seek higher payoff in an alliance
as compared to the payoff they can generate on their own. We divide the rationality
constraints into different sets, depending on the number of carriers considered. For
example, two carrier rationality constraints is the set of rationality constraints for all
subsets with two carriers and is denoted by {2}. To study the effect of rationality
constraints we introduce one set of rationality constraints at a time to the inverse
problem INV P . Inverse program together with all the single carrier rationality con-
straints is denoted as INV P + {1} and inverse program together with all the single
carrier and two carrier rationality constraints is denoted as INV P+{1}+{2}. Recall
that INV P is a feasibility problem and the payoff allocation made by our algorithms
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is always budget balance. Thus for a three carrier alliance if INV P + {1} + {2} is
feasible than it means that a cost structure that yields payoff allocation in the core
can be identified.
Table 6 reports the effect of different assignment of ships on the service routes
and the effect of rationality constraints on the solution quality for 3 carrier alliances
and different test classes. In this table, we use {0} to denote that INV P is solved,
{1} to denote that INV P + {1} is solved and {1} + {2} to denote that INV P +
{1} + {2} is solved. The first column denotes different problem classes. It indicates
the total number of ports, ships and demand pairs considered. Each demand and
ship is assigned to one of the three carriers with equal probability. The next three
columns report the number of instances (out of 50) for which an allocation in the
core is found when the SAP is solved exactly and the utility function is taken to be
proportional to the flow times the revenue. The second column reports this number
when the inverse problem INV P is solved. The third, and fourth column report these
numbers when the inverse problem (INV P ) is solved together with all single carrier
rationality constraints and (INV P ) is solved with all single and two carrier rationality
constraints, respectively. The next three triplet of columns report the corresponding
numbers when SAP is solved exactly, greedily and randomly, respectively. In these
cases the utility function is taken to be proportional to the flow.
Different assignment algorithms and utility functions result in different number of
ships being assigned by a carrier to each of the selected service routes. This in turn
influences a carrier’s valuation (80) of the optimal solution and the way the optimal
solution is realized by the alliance. Note that the inverse problem computes the cost
structure for a given assignment of ships to the service routes. Table 6 suggests
that the number of cases for which the mechanism successfully finds a cost structure
does not depend significantly on the assignment of ships to the service routes. If we









































































































































































































































service routes, in most of the instances the mechanism finds a cost structure that
yields an allocation in the core.
From Theorem 7, the inverse program INV P is feasible. We found in our compu-
tational study that inverse problem together with single carrier rationality constraints
is also feasible in all the instances. However, in some cases a feasible solution for
INV P +{1}+{2} could not be found. Note that for three carrier alliances a solution
to INV P + {1}+ {2} means that a cost structure that yields payoffs in the core can
be identified. For INV P and INV P +{1} we report if the feasible solution provided
by CPLEX is in the core. For these cases there might be alternate solutions and some
might provide an allocation in the core (for example, instances in which we find an
allocation in the core by considering INV P + {1} + {2} but not when we consider
INV P or INV P + {1}).
Table (6) suggests that a feasible solution to (INV P ) in 10-25% of the instances
directly yields an allocation in the core. As the inverse problem is constrained by
adding single carrier rationality constraints in 25-45% of the instances the feasible
solution yields an allocation in the core. Further INV P + {1} + {2} is feasible in
70-95% of the cases, depending on the test class. Thus in 70-95% of the cases our
mechanism provides an allocation in the core. Recall that it is not necessary that an
instance will have a non-empty core.
5.5.2 Analysis of Different Test Classes
We analyze different test classes in Table 7. We consider alliances with three carriers.
Ships and demand pairs are distributed uniformly among the carriers. We solve the
ship assignment problem exactly and the utility of assigning a ship to a service route
for a carrier is taken proportional to the sum of his flow times the revenue on the edges
of the service route. First column in Table 7 denotes different problem classes. For
each test class, the second column reports the average CPU time taken (averaged over
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Table 7: Analysis of test classes.
Test Time # Non Non-empty core Empty core
Class -empty %Unmet Unused %Utilizi %Unmet Unused %Utiliz
core demand ships -ation demand ships -ation
P6S18D6 1.92 48 21.9 0.5 0.70 41.6 1 0.59
P6S18D9 3.08 49 36.93 0.25 0.82 45.07 0 0.96
P6S30D6 5.75 36 3.61 2.22 0.64 0.25 3.29 0.56
P6S30D9 8.60 46 11.60 0.76 0.77 5.30 0.75 0.72
P10S30D18 98.01 50 43.83 0.04 0.83 N/A N/A N/A
P10S30D27 181.46 50 58.91 0 0.86 N/A N/A N/A
P10S50D18 306.12 50 16.90 0.45 0.88 N/A N/A N/A
P10S50D27 514.61 50 28.19 0 0.91 N/A N/A N/A
P10S50D10 48.70 35 0.52 4.39 0.60 0.63 6.43 0.65
50 instances) in minutes to solve a problem instance. This includes the time to solve
the service design problem for all the subsets of carriers and the time taken to solve the
inverse problem. The third column represents the number of instances, out of a total
of 50 random instances generated for each test class, for which an allocation in the
core exists. To test if the core of a problem is non-empty, a linear program consisting
of all the core inequalities is constructed and its feasibility is tested. The next three
columns report the average percentage of unsatisfied demand to the total demand,
the average number of un-utilized ships and the average utilization of capacity on the
edges of the network respectively, for the instances with a non-empty core. The next
three columns report same statistics for the cases with empty core.
The second column in Table 7 suggests that as the problem size (number of ports,
ships or demand pairs) increases the time taken to solve the problem increases. Also,
more than 95% of the time reported here is taken in solving the network design
problem for various subset of carriers. The increase in time taken to solve the network
design problem with the increase in problem size is similar to the trend reported in
[1].
Note that among the test classes with 6 ports, P6S30D6 has the highest num-
ber of instances with an empty core. A closer look at Table 7 reveals that this test
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class has the highest number of un-used ships and the lowest percentage of unsat-
isfied demand. Also instances in this class have lower utilization of capacity on the
edges of the network. More specifically, these networks have over capacity. We con-
structed an additional class of instances namely P10S50D10. These instances also
have over-capacity and show similar behavior as that of instances in the P6S30D6
class. Specifically, many instances in test class P10S50D10 also have empty core.
This leads us to the conclusion that instances with over-capacity are more likely to
have an empty core. The primary motivation for carriers to collaborate in liner ship-
ping is that they do not have enough ships to maintain weekly frequency on the
routes. For instances other than in P6S30D6 and P10S50D10 test class, since car-
riers and subset of carriers have few ships (as compared to the available demand),
in most of the cases the grand alliance offers the best possibility for maintaining the
required frequency on the service routes and thus most of the instances have non-
empty core. Instances in P6S30D6 and P10S50D10 test classes, are however more
likely to have profitable sub-coalitions. Our experiments yield that subsets of carriers
that have good synergy in the origin- destination port of their demand triplets are
more likely to form sub-coalitions. In general, if sub-coalitions have higher synergies
(as compared to the grand alliance) then it is less likely that the grand alliance will
be formed. Also there are fewer incentives for carriers to get into the organizational
and managerial complexities of big alliances.
For 6 port instances with 18 ships, the percentage of unsatisfied demand is quite
high. Further the average un-satisfied demand for the instances with empty core is
even higher than the average un-satisfied demand for the instances with non-empty
core. Thus instances with small fleet size in which carriers find synergies among
themselves to satisfy higher demand are more likely to have a stable grand alliance.
Also we note from Table 7 that as the size of the network increases from 6 to 10 ports
all the instances in all the test classes (except P10S50D10) have non-empty core.
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Instances with 10 ports that have very high demand as compared to the available
fleet (un-satisfied demand is 40-60% of the total demand) are very likely to form
stable grand alliance. In these instances, as there is a shortage of ships, only the
grand alliance provides a global optimal schedule for the available fleet. Table 7
reflects that in fact the grand alliance schedules almost all the ships in the fleet and
provides very high utilization of capacity (85-95%) on the operated routes.
Note that from Table 6 and Table7, if the core of a problem instance is non-empty,
our mechanism succeeds in finding an allocation in the core in almost all (95-100%) of
the instances, when the inverse problem is considered with all the subset rationality
constraints.
5.5.3 Size and Number of Carriers
Next, we study the effect of number of carriers in an alliance. Table 8 reports results
for alliances with two, three and four carriers. The first column represents the test
class. To generate instances with i-carriers the number of demand pairs and ships
are distributed uniformly randomly among i carriers. Thus, Table 8 reports results
for alliances among carriers with similar characteristics. The second and the third
column report results for alliances with two carriers. The second column reports the
number of instances (out of 50) for which an allocation in the core exists. The third
column reports the average (average taken over 50 instances) percentage improvement
in the total revenue generated by the alliance as compared to sum of the revenue gen-
erated by individual carriers working independently. The next two twins of columns
report similar statistics for alliances with three and four carriers, respectively. For a
particular instance, the percentage improvement in the revenue generated as a result









Table 8: Analysis of the size of an alliance.
Test 2-Carriers 3-Carriers 4-Carriers
Class core % improvement core % improvement core % improvement
P6S18D6 50 63.04 48 275.45 46 717.40
P6S18D9 50 40.73 36 167.60 37 475.61
P6S30D6 50 17.11 36 50.58 29 117.87
P6S30D9 50 20.12 46 66.17 43 115.64
P10S30D18 50 26.91 50 61.05 50 99.65
P10S30D27 50 19.68 50 53.42 48 88.13
P10S50D18 50 14.24 50 31.38 48 72.11
P10S50D27 50 15.94 50 32.36 49 69.45
Table 8 suggests that as the number of carriers increases in an alliance, the al-
liance tends to become more un-stable in the sense that the number of instances
with a non-empty core decreases. Note that as the number of carriers increases the
number of constraints that need to be satisfied to obtain an allocation in the core
increases exponentially. Higher the number of constraints higher the chances that
the constraints will conflict with each other and thus higher the chances that the
core will be empty. With higher number of carriers in an alliance it is more likely
that some subset of carriers will have better synergies for an alliance than the grand
alliance. Qualitatively, as the number of carriers increase in an alliance the organiza-
tional complexity of the alliance increases and the decision making process becomes
time consuming. One of the most successful alliances among liner carriers have been
the Maersk-Sealand alliance which consists of only two carriers [64]. Some of the
bigger alliances have organized and re-organized themselves a number of times within
a short span of time. For example, the Global Alliance which was formed in 1995
among four carriers (APL, OOCL, MOL and Nedlloyd) reorganized in 1998 to form
the New World Alliance (NOL/APL, MOL, HMM) after the merger of APL and NOL
in 1997.
The third, fifth and the seventh column of Table 8 clearly shows that alliances
can generate higher revenues as compared to the carriers operating on their own. For
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a particular instance, i.e. for a given set of ports, fleet size and demand pairs, as we
increase the number of carriers (that is distribute the fleet and demand pairs among a
larger number of carriers), the revenue that an individual carrier can generate reduces.
However, the optimal solution of the grand alliance remains the same, independent of
the number of carriers in the alliance. Thus, as reflected by Table 8 the the percentage
increase in the revenue generated as a result of the alliance increases as the number
of carriers increases.
5.5.4 Role and Contribution of Carriers in an Alliance
We study how participants with complementary and similar roles influence an alliance.
Specifically, we study the alliance between a ship owner and a group of shippers. That
is one player has all the ships and the other players have all the demand. First, we
study instances (drawn from different test classes P6S18D6 - P10S50D27) with one
ship owner and one shipper. This is a perfect situation for collaboration and all
these instances have a non-empty core. Further, in all such instances our mechanism
provides a cost structure such that the resulting payoffs to both the participants is in
the core, when the inverse problem is solved with all the subset rationality constraints.
Thus a stable alliance can be formed in all these instances. Next, we study problem
instances with three shippers and a single ship owner. Depending on the problem
instance (P6S30D9 etc) we found that the core is non-empty in 90%- 100% of the
cases. Among the instances with non-empty core, in 95%-100% of the instances our
mechanism provides a cost structure such that the resulting payoff to the participants
is in the core. Comparing one ship owner and one shipper case with the one ship
owner and three shippers case we conclude that in the latter case, shippers give rise
to competition and instability in the grand alliance.
An interesting observation is that for P6S30D6 problem instances for one ship
owner and three shippers case, 98% of the instances have non-empty core. Whereas,
117
for this test class when the ships and demand pairs are distributed uniformly among
four carriers only 58% of the instances have non-empty core (Table 8). For the
P6S30D6 class the number of ships are enough to satisfy most of the demand, thus
even if there are three competing shippers the alliance is stable. As the ship owner
has sufficient number of ships, he has an incentive to collaborate with as many ship-
pers as possible to increase his revenue. Similarly, though the shippers compete for
capacity on the ships, in the case when the system has over-capacity they can all form
a sustainable alliance with the ship owner. However this is not the case when ships
and demand pairs are uniformly distributed among four carriers as many subset of
carriers find synergies to form sub-coalitions. In general, for other test classes also,
instances with ships and demand pairs distributed among one ship owner and three
shippers are more likely to have a non-empty core as compared to four equi-sized
carriers. This is simply because in the former scenario the players have higher degree
of complementarity in their role. Carriers have used conferences and alliances to fix
price and moderate the buying power of shippers. As a result of our experiments we
conclude that it is a good strategy for shippers also to form alliances and consolidate
cargo before negotiating with the carriers and ship operators. This practice is ob-
served in the industry as giant shippers and freight-forwarders consolidate the cargo
of small shippers.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we addressed various problems posed by alliance formation among
carriers in the liner shipping industry. We designed allocation mechanism for an
alliance to share the benefits of the alliance in such a way that all the members are
motivated to act in the best interest of the alliance. Since the revenue generated by the
collaborative solution alone is not enough to guarantee the satisfaction of an individual
carrier, the mechanism provides side payments to the carriers to motivate them to
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“play along” in the alliance. Considering our preliminary results, we believe that
the suggested solution approach has the potential to help carriers form sustainable
alliances.
Our experiments suggest that across all test classes, in most (more than 95%)
of the instances that have non-empty core our mechanism successfully finds a cost
structure such that the resulting payoff to the carriers is in the core, when the inverse
problem is solved with all the rationality constraints. Assignment of ships to the
service routes influences the cost incurred by a carrier (thus his payoff) and the
ownership of capacity on the edges by the carriers. However our results indicate that
independent of the assignment of ships to the service routes in most of the cases
our mechanism successfully finds a cost structure such that the overall payoff to the
carriers is in the core. Analysis of different test classes suggests that the core is empty
for a very high number of instances (more than 72%) drawn from the classes in which
carriers have sufficient number of ships to satisfy the available demand. Further
our experiments yield that, as the number of carriers increase in an alliance, the
percentage improvement in the total revenue generated by the alliance as compared
to the sum of the revenue generated by individual carrier independently increases.
However, it becomes harder to find a solution in the core as the number of constraints
to obtain a core allocation increase exponentially with the number of carriers. Further
we conclude that carriers who have complementarity in their roles, for example ship
owners and freight forwarders, are more likely to form stable alliances. Note that
many other factors (such as compatibility in mission, strategy, governance, culture,
organization and management etc of different partners of an alliance) also contribute
significantly to the success of an alliance.
In this chapter we considered alliance formation among 3-4 carriers. For these
alliances we considered all subset rationality constraints to find an allocation in the
core. In many transportation and other logistics problems it is necessary to consider
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alliances with higher number of participants. Also in liner shipping, smaller alliances
are collaborating to from even bigger alliances, for example Grand Alliance and The
New World Alliance laid down foundations for cooperation in 2006. However con-
sidering all rationality constraints becomes prohibitively expensive as the number of
carriers increase in an alliance. To extend the mechanism developed in this chapter
for alliances with higher number of participants, subset rationality constraints need
to be added in the inverse problem in a constraint generation setting.
The liner shipping industry is deploying bigger and bigger ships. Further research
is required to study the viability of bigger ships and their impact on alliances. These
issues have also been studied by [35].
This chapter provides a basic framework for the research that can be used for
designing allocation mechanism for various network design problems. The research
integrates tools from optimization, economics and mathematics to study the selfish





A.1 Name of carriers
APL : American President Line
CGM : Compagnie Generale Maritime
CMA : Compagnie Maritime d’Affrtement
COSCO : China Ocean Shipping Company
Hamburg Sud : Hamburg Sud Group
Hapag Lloyd : Hapag-Lloyd AG
HMM : Hyundai Merchant Marine
K Line : Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha
Maersk : A.P.Moller-Maersk Line
Marfret : Marfret Compagnie Maritime
MISC : Malaysian International Shipping Corporation
MOL : Mitsui OSK Lines
NYK : Nippon Yusen Kaisha
OOCL : Orient Overseas Container Lines
P&O : P & O Container Line
Sea-Land : Sea-Land Service Inc.
Yang Ming : Yang Ming Line
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